ace at the Hague had been of late years reserved entirely for princely use. Like other free peoples, the Dutch were peculiarly sensitive as to any right of way being taken from them; and the restriction, when once brought clearly to public notice in the growing agitation, gave dire offence. And to these disputes there came to be added a more serious difference still, one of some real constitutional importance, as to the right to the command of the palace guard. The deputies of the provinces asserted an hereditary claim to appoint to it, granted to them expressly to secure the independence of their deliberations against a populace supposed from its local conditions to be subservient to the ruling house. Worsted on all these points, William V. not only showed his personal annoyance by suddenly ceasing to wear his own military uniform in public, but declined to reside any longer in a capital where he considered himself subject to insult. He withdrew altogether from the Hague, and dwelt for a time chiefly at his château of Loo in the province of Gelderland, where his party was still in a decided majority.
His retreat at this crisis, however, naturally gave increased strength to the opposition in Holland; and if Holland should decide to cast his authority off, he could hardly be deemed the actual Stadtholder of the Netherlands any longer. Yet she, powerful as her superiority in wealth and population made her, and in despite of her contribution of more than half the charges of the Federation, was for some months overborne in the votes of the States-General, where Utrecht (excepting only its capital), Zealand, Friesland, and Gelderland were faithful to the prince. Parties in each had been formed against him, and were in active correspondence with the patriots at Amsterdam; but the governments still adhered to their allegiance.
There was a sort of armed truce during the summer of 1786, in which the more cautious spirits were striving to patch up the difference, while the more far-seeing prepared for the armed struggle that was inevitable. This was presently broken by the warmth of party-spirit in Gelderland, the most Orange in opinion of the seven States. Here two small towns, Hattem and Elburg, where the patriotic party had gained the upper hand in the municipalities, refused further obedience to the decrees of the provincial legislature or States, declaring it incompetent to act in the absence of their deputies. The States then called upon the Prince of Orange in his capacity of captain-general of the province to use armed force in defence of their prerogative. Nothing loth to act under constitutional powers, William marched on the recusant towns with such troops as he had at hand, acting, as his party put the matter, in his magisterial rather than his strictly military capacity. But his opponents did not wait his coming. Protesting against the violence intended, they left their homes to go a few miles into the neighbouring province of Overyssel, where feeling, was strong against the Stadtholder; thus giving the appearance of the first call for armed forces as coming from the Orange side. Holland then decided on action from which there could hardly be any appeal but to the sword. She had temporized hitherto, according to such Prussian writers as Baron Troschke, chiefly because her leaders were endeavouring to get back from distant parts of the United Provinces the regiments quartered there, but raised and paid by her. The proceedings in Gelderland caused caution and concealment to be laid aside and on September 22nd the province by its States directed that the Prince of Orange should be suspended from his functions of captain-general of Holland. The glorious federation that had astonished the world hardly less by the firmness of its union than the gallantry of its actions seemed at once to be dissolved by this daring step. Order and counter-order from either side contended for observance; and the hour had at last come when constitutional forms were strained till they broke, and personal choice for prince or province became a hard duty to be incumbent upon all. Out of the general confusion of the few months that followed, the truth appeared that if the prince trusted to the armed power at his command for the restoration of his hereditary rights, his trust would be in vain. The troops he
