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the future, especially when the enemy is inclined to attack in the mass. In hill warfare these weapons scarcely get a proper chance, as they are not very well suited for picking off individuals and as it is dangerous to thrust them too far to the front with the small parties which are so much used in operations of this class. In bush warfare also the want of a fair target is unfavourable to them, and when the shooting is at short range the detachment is likely to be put hors de combat, as it offers such a good target; this happened at Owikokaro. An open field of fire and a well-defined object to aim at are almost more necessary to machine guns than to artillery. On the defensive, machine guns can hardly fail to be valuable. In laager, zarebas, and detached posts of all kinds they are always likely to be of service, and to a certain extent they may take the place of guns for such work. During the operations in Rhodesia in 1896 they were found very useful as a protection to the small laagers left behind by the columns when they moved out for a fight. Two of them did tremendous execution in Chakdara Fort during the siege of that post in 1897. It is interesting to note that at the fight on the Shangani River in Matabililand after the attempt to capture the king had failed, the troops, although they were in a bad position, could not move to a better one for a while, simply because the machine guns would have been thrown out of action during the change of position. Against