the brigade is engaged in a decisive attack, the best results will usually be obtained by unity of command. By a timely concentration of fire machine guns may thus be the deciding factor in the struggle for superiority of fire.
When control is difficult, or when the brigade is extended over a wide front, it will usually be better to leave guns with their units.
3. It will often be advisable to employ both methods and to leave their machine guns with the battalions which are first extended, while those of reserve battalions are placed under the command of the brigade machine-gun officer.
4. Although machine guns can move with deployed infantry under fire, they should rarely attempt to keep pace with attacking infantry. When they have gained a position from which they can effectively support their infantry in the struggle for fire superiority and in the assault, they should only be moved for good and sufficient reasons. The difficulties of ranging and of concealment on the move usually outweigh the advantages of decreasing the range.
5. Machine guns will usually find opportunities for employment in the attack in assisting the advance of their infantry by means of covering fire; in protecting attacking infantry against counter-attack or against cavalry; in assisting the infantry in the fire fight, and in preparing for the assault by sudden bursts of converging fire against the objective of the
