Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 6.djvu/571

BRUNSCHVICG, La ModdliU du Jugement. 555 fines the problem ' ; the second is historical ; the third gives M. Brunschvicg's own view of the nature of modality ; the fourth attempts to determine the modality of twelve types of ' theoretical judgment,' and the fifth does the same for twelve corresponding types of ' practical judgment ' ; finally, the sixth chapter is a short ' Conclusion '. The first chapter opens with a statement of the author's concep- tion of philosophy, under the head of ' the notion of intellectual activity '. He explains that the aim of philosophy is ' to be an integral knowledge ' ; and that, whereas metaphysicians at first tried unsuccessfully to obtain this knowledge, by determining ' the total object,' ' criticism ' has recognised that ontology, i.e. such a knowledge of ' being, as such ' (Vetre en tant qu'etre) is impossible, and that philosophy must confine itself to ' being, as known,' or rather, says M. Brunschvicg, t6 ' knowledge, as being ' (la connais- sance en tant qu'etre). Now, it is precisely in this last identifi- cation that I think the fallacy of M. Brunschvicg's whole position lies. His ' criticism ' seems never to have been so thorough as to raise the question : Is ' being, qua known ' really indistinguishable from ' knowledge, qua existent ' ? We may fully agree with him that, when he says ' Intelligence is transparent only to in- telligence,' and therefore concludes that the study of ' will ' cannot be ' the fundamental and primitive part of philosophy,' he is ex- pressing an important truth ; but, so far from drawing from this the inference that the essential function of philosophy is the study of ' intellectual activity,' there is surely good reason for inferring exactly the opposite. Intellectual activity, qua activity, seems to be merely a form of conation, and is therefore a subject-matter of psychology, not of philosophy. It is not the process of cognition or judging, but knowledge or judgment, in so far as they are true, which offer to metaphysics that point of departure, which justifies itself, and so distinguishes this from every other study. M. Brunschvicg, in fact, seems to lay himself open to the very question which he urges against ' the first metaphysicians '. How does he know that this object, which he proposes to study, ' cogni- tion, qud existent,' is ' directly grasped ' ? ' Qud existent' it would seem to be just as exterior to him as any other object. But 'being, qud known ' is an object not liable to the same objection. For the question : How do I know that what I know is ? supplies its own answer, simply because, to say that a thing is known, implies that it is true ; not because, to say that it is known, implies that it is an object of intellectual activity. You cannot affirm that nothing whatever is true, without contradicting yourself ; for you imply that what you affirm is true itself ; but you can affirm that intel- lectual activity does not exist, without a contradiction ; because what you affirm may be true, even if it is not true that you are affirming it. M. Brunschvicg seems, then, throughout his book to confuse epistemology with psychology. He never asks himself the ques-