Page:Mind (New Series) Volume 9.djvu/381

DR. WAIJO'S KKl-TTATION OK DUALISM. :>7 Passing to consider the relation between individual ex- perience, and Experience as the result of intercourse between individuals (intersubjective intercourse), it is shown that the second -the empirical knowledge which men have in common, matised and formulated by the help of abstract concep- tions is really only an extension of individual experience. The current Dualism of Mind and Nature is shown to have arisen from the fact that while Psychology undertook to deal with individual (' Subjective ') Experience, Natural Science occupied itself with ' Objective ' or Common Experience ; and we may therefore hope to refute Dualism by making clear the relation of these two forms or phases of Experience. Each individual in his own private experience is face to face with objective reality in the most fundamental sense for even Sensations are essentially objective are for Cogni- tion a ' this ' and a ' what ' have inalienable characteristics (cf. ii., 113, 116). In this experience the stage in which there are definite conceptions is preceded by a stage in which there are none, and in the earlier stage there is no distinction between percept and object, no trace of Dualism. To illu>- trate the organic unity of individual experience, Dr. Ward considers it with reference to Range in Time, Familiarity or Expertness and Intellective Synthesis. With regard to the first he points out that for any experience at all there must l>e an enduring present and for its fuller development some memory of the past this of course implies a measure of that abstract generality or universality which is opposed to merely concrete particularity. What we know as past has the marks of the past about it, and as we know present objects immediately, so what we remember our own past experi- ence we know immediately also. Its " temporal signs . . . plainly bespeak that unity and solidarity of individual experi- ence that only subjective activity and interest can bring about" (ii., 158). " In this way there arises at once our subjective or biotic time, along with its concrete ' filling,' both inseparable from the individual subject to which as its own objective ex- perience they immediately pertain. It is from this that we advance to the mediate conceptions, first of trans-subjective or common time, and finally of absolute time. Again it is from the immediately presented content of this subjective time . . . that we proceed to range events chronologically in the common historical time which we come to think of in dualistic fashion as independent of all subjective factors " (ii., 158). Space is shown to be amenable to similar general considerations (in- cluding some ubiquity in individual experience, analogous to the more or less enduriruj now above referred to) ; and if the