XI. PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS. PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. Vol. viii., No. 6. O. T. Ladd. ' The Philo- sophical Basis of Literature.' [The philosophical basis of literature u " man's power to express his ideas of value in language whose form com- mends itself to a cultivated aesthetical appreciation as suitable to such ideas ". Detailed consideration of language, of the philosophy of form, and of ideas of value (happiness, sublimity, moral excellence!, with illustrations from literature.] W. Caldwcll. ' Von Hartmann's Moral and Social Philosophy (II.). The Metaphysic.' [The various forms of the metaphysie of ethics : metaphysical monism, the religious principle, the absolute moral principle, the negative-absolute-eudiemonistic (salva- tion) principle. The positive outcome of Hartmann's dialectic seems to be that morally educated and experienced men can help to redeem humanity by freeing it from the happiness-notion. Various uses of the term 'unconscious,' as (1) the unconscious in nature and history ; (-2) the unconscious as desire ; and (3) as evil. Outcome of the philosophy of the unconscious : "in the moral life we may be obliged to follow out many ends that are prescribed to us more by the unconscious logic of our nature than by our conscious reason, and also by the unconscious logic of nature or of history ".] H. Davies. Psychological Experiences Implicating the Concept of Substance.' [The concept of substantiality is involved in (1) ' awareness ' of an object ; t'2) all experiences where the mind actively discriminates itself as the ego ; and (3) the sense of a transcendent activity applying the logical function on the basis of essential and mutual activity between the two orders of our experience. Critique under these three rubrics of the views of Kant, Wundt, Ward, James ; Spinoza, Kant, Spencer ; Kant, Hegel.] Reviews of Books. Summaries of Articles. Notices of New Books. Notes. Vol. ix., No. 1. Q-. H. Mead. ' Suggestions towards a Theory of the Philosophical ] >isciplines.' [Assumes that "analytical thought commences with the presence of problems and the conflict between different lines of activity," and continues as the expression of such conflict and the solution of the problems involved. On this basis, metaphysics may be regarded as the statement of the problem, deductive logic as interpretation in terms of past experience, psychology as the abandoning of all but subjective validity and the implied looking forward to new meanings, inductive logic as the advance to a new universal, etc. Follows Dewey, but lacks Dewey's clearness.] F. Thilly. ' Conscience.' [Psychological analysis of conscience, as a specific feeling, or complex of feeling and impulse. This feeling of obligation comes late in the history of the individual and the race. It may become fixed and habitual, and be heritable. The judgments of conscience are analytical.] W. A. Heidel. Metaphysics, Ethics and Religion.' [The typical form of progressive mental life is " intellectually mediated activity toward the realisation of ends, the cycle being completed by the purposed act ". To understand the standpoints and conceptions of metaphysics, etc., we have to examine them with n view to their localisation at the appropriate juncture in the Ideological cycle at which they take their rise. A second exposition of Dewey's
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