SOMK I'HYSICM, CONCLUSIONS IN RESlT.i 1 10 BPAOB. 52* Spencer proposes that some absolute existence (so-called " onto- logical order ") is transformed by interaction between it and our consciousness into Space. It would follow then that this entity (" ontological order ") which by interaction on us is to generate Space as a resultant must itself exist without Space. In other words (as a preliminary), Space, previous to its generation in this way, must be imagined absent from existence. Nevertheless, in the Firnt I'rinciples, Mr. Spencer says : " The non-existence of space cannot, however, by any mental effort be imagined" (p. 34). Space cannot then (according to Mr. Spencer's own words) be imagined absent from existence. This is, however, precisely the condition indispensable for his peculiar theory of Space generated by assumed interaction between an "ontological order" and our consciousness. If then Space cannot be supposed to be generated by the action of anything on consciousness, it can at least be coMeived to be an absolute existence, present already, before mind was. There would seem to be little profit in seeking to ascribe peculiar qualities to Space, such as "curvature," by doubting the axiom of parallels, or that the properties of a triangle are in- dependent of its size : and it may seem even a question to some whether hypotheses of this kind may not tend somewhat to shake the stability of mathematical conceptions. For it appears that assumptions of this character (even if they have some ulterior purpose 1 ) only become plausible by assigning to Space some specific "texture" or structure; i.e., by /</ viewing Space as pure Void or vacuity. How can the imagina- tion seize a foothold to conceive curvature, unless some texture (structure) or specific quality be postulated for Space? Can a Void be imagined curved, it may be asked? The assumption of a structure for Space rejects (it may be noticed) the deepest or most abstract conception. For possibly Void may be said to be the most penetrating concept of the human mind. Directly structure [Prof Clifford remarks on " the sharp points, edges and furrows of space " 2 ] is attributed to Space, then the intellect can take a profounder step, and place this entity (with structure) in a Void, i.e., in Space itself. Can it not be said, therefore Refrain from giving structure, in order that space may remain space. Some might urge A less abstract concept of Space is possi But anything whatever possessing structure (to which forces could in conception be attached) can be imagined to exisi Space. This structural entity is, therefore, not Space Moreover, a structural entity of any sort can easily be con< Such a S the tentative development of formulas etc., on the basis of particular hypotheses assumed. 'Prof. Clifford's Lectures and Essays, vol. i., p. 3-21. A cnti the above view is ventured with every respect
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