JOHN BURNET, The Ethics of .1 ;/.,/.//,. .VU Til- <!p^<ov itvrt cvravGa seem to point in the direction of this interpretation. Mr. Burnet's argument that " the word <V>V, 'starting point,' is wide enough to cover the hypothesis of an analytical proof . . . and such an hypothesis is not based upon ground'" proves no more than the possibility of the other interpretation. Most appropriately dpvij means the principles of mathematics, and they, rather than the Hypothesis in analysis, may be said not to be based on any ground. A reference to j 26 of the introduction may conclude our dis- cussion of the question of method. The section begins with the wurds " Once, however, we have got our definition, the procedure becomes quite different," i.e., becomes analytic, and goes on to explain that the premisses and conclusions of Ethics must be <!> eVi TO irv and not exact. This arrangement of topics is apt to lead one to suppose that Ethics uses dialectic only when it is dis- covering its apxrj, whereas, of course, it is just the inexactness of Ethics that constitutes its dialectical character. In a word, Mr. Burnet hardly seems to distinguish with sufficient clearness be- tween dialectic and analysis. One might say that dialectic is not a method at all. There are just two methods, a direct and an inverse, which may be described as synthesis and analysis. These methods may be applied to different kinds of matter. For instance, when they are applied to the matter of science, synthesis is .;-.;. Seifts TOU Sm, analysis is a7ro8is TOV on. The last section of the introduction discusses the doctrine of the Categories and the part it plays in the criticism (Nic. Ethics, L, 6) of Plato's Universal Good. Mr. Burnet, following Apelt, shows that the Categories are intended to solve the well-known difficulties about predication, and he assents to the view that " the table of the categories is not Aristotle's at all, but simply part of his heritage from the Academy". "We shall have no difficulty in accepting the positive statement that Xenokrates reduced the categories to two only, Substance and Relation. If that is so, we shall see that, in accordance with his method, Aristotle was bound to argue against the Platonic view from some position admitted by the Academy " (p. 1.). This view seems too extreme. One may ^rant that Plato or at least Xenocrates had practically arrived at the doctrine of the Categories. But the way in which the doc- trine is used throughout the Aristotelian treatises makes it hardly possible to doubt that the doctrine is Aristotle's own, or at least a doctrine with which he completely identifies himself. The sug- gestion that Aristotle supposed himself bound to argue against the Academy from a position admitted by them, ruiv otVctW 8awi4rar, depends of course on the general assumption that the Ethics is purely dialectical. This assumption, however, can hardly be ac- cepted. Throughout the Ethics, as Mr. Burnet really admits, Aristotle makes use of his own physical theories. Why then should he not use his own metaphysics? In truth, the general character of the Ethics is essentially determined by the fact that
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