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THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.
[Vol. I.

failure to make the distinction between its ratio cognoscendi and its ratio essendi. But without entering into any elaborate explanation of this complexity we shall simply tabulate the results of our analysis, relying upon the knowledge of the reader for a correct understanding of it. It may be best, notwithstanding, to explain why we recognize two general kinds of freedom. This is to emphasize the distinction between what may be called physico-political freedom and psychological freedom. They are not the same kinds of freedom, as every one will recognize; the former being characterized merely by the absence of influences for determining the alternatives between which it is the interest of the person to choose, and the latter by the notion of self-initiative. In the sequel also we shall require to take some notice of the doctrine of responsibility, in order to evade the usual confusion between this notion and that of freedom. The following is a tabular analysis of the notions entering into the idea of free volition, or that are connected with it.


Ratio cognoscendi of = Absence of external influences. = Absence of determination by external influences. 1. Consciousness. 2. Absence of external influences. 3. Absence of motives or of determining motives. 4. Avoidability of the alternative actually chosen. 5. Deliberative choice. Negative: Absence of determining influence of external agencies. Positive: Autonomy or self-initiative.

Physico-political Ratio essendi of Metaphysical or Psychological Ratio cognoscendi of Ratio essendi of


In this outline there is little distinction between the third, fourth, and fifth ratio cognoscendi. They imply each other, but are mentioned separately because they represent so many ways of considering the question. It will be noticed also that we distinguish clearly between the absence of external agencies and the absence of their determining influence on the will, this being done because we do not regard freedom as incompatible