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THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.
[Vol. I.

— how pre-eminently so above other senses subsequently added to the nervous organism for the purpose of mediating other less fundamental functions.

This, however, is but the beginning of the story. If, as we have postulated, another sense, as pain, should presently be introduced, specially to perform the functions significant of danger and of detriment, not only by this specialization would the new sense become representative of detriment, but also, in proportion, would the old sense be relieved of this class of functions. And in proportion as it would cease to perform functions significant of detriment, the less then would it be woven into detrimental experiences, and the less would it be mentally representative of detriment and of aversion. And as this occurred the more specifically, therefore, would the primary sense be representative of beneficial occurrences and of desire.

But more follows with the addition of still other senses in the development of our worm toward man. Every new sense taken up into the organism is certain to perform some function less fundamental to that organism than that performed by the primary sense. Though, on the whole, each new sense must be representative of more benefit than detriment, yet it will be far less specially representative of benefit than we have seen the first sense become after being relieved of mediating experiences peculiarly representative of detriment. Thus, sight, though enormously beneficial on the whole, continually pours in upon us a flood of experiences of no benefit whatever. We have already compared the primary sense of our worm with pleasure as developed in us. Our abstract notions, being residuary impressions of past experiences of a particular kind, are in a way fair tests of these experiences. The common notion of pleasure since philosophy began is that essentially it is the expression of our well-being. No such notion has ever arisen regarding sight. The notion is a competent indication, we think, of how much more fundamentally and representatively our first sense has been woven into our beneficial experiences, both biological and psychological, than have any of our other senses.