judgment as thought has two members. The expression, however, may be incomplete, either the subject or the predicate being omitted. K. investigates the conditions under which the subject is omitted, and reaches the conclusion that impersonals of all classes name some definite occurrence or state of things without any thought of an efficient subject. The subject in the wider sense is the concrete-real occurrence or state which we have in mind but do not bring to spoken expression. K. discusses further the origin and proper designation of impersonals, and the significance of the third person singular, and of the 'es' or 'it' in such expressions.
PSYCHOLOGICAL.
Æsthetic theory has gained little of fundamental importance from the discussions by philosophers in the past. This is not because æsthetic problems have been neglected by the best thinkers, but rather because they have looked upon them as secondary issues. Non-hedonistic æsthetic theories have, from a psychological point of view, resulted in failure. Hedonic the æsthetic psychosis certainly is. Whether this hedonic quality is of great moment, is a question to be determined. M. agrees that associations which are pleasurable are important elements in an æsthetic effect; but if the associationist means that æsthetic effect is determined altogether by pleasure-revivals, he cannot follow, for presentation pleasures certainly have much to do with the effects of beauty. If, on the other hand, the associationist means to identify hedonic phenomena and æsthetic phenomena, we are at once met with the objection that, while æsthetic states of mind are pleasurable, not all pleasurable states are allowed to pass for æsthetic. What are the bounds of the æsthetic within the hedonic field? Kant distinguishes the agreeable from the beautiful by the supposed presence of sense pleasure in the former, and the absence of the same in the latter. This distinction cannot be accepted. Eye and ear sensations are obvious exceptions; but if it be admitted that one set of senses can produce æsthetic effects, the whole contention fails, and a close examination shows clearly that the rest of the senses may act in the same manner in the make-up of æsthetic complexes. Pleasures of the typical emotions are also of great moment in æsthetics, but they do not stand alone, as some have held. 'Association' by itself can, of course, give no account of distinctively æsthetic effect. Recognized, as well as unrecognized,
