Page:Philosophical Review Volume 1.djvu/643

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No. 6.]
PLEASURE-PAIN AND SENSATION.
627

should never think of classifying thus: e.g. the psychic phase which fixes our conviction that an object of revival is real and not a pure imagination, — that which makes the difference between a memory or an expectation, and a mere revival; which latter may have very clear time relations without being thought real in that time. It is to be noted also that the argument which we here examine is of little value unless we agree to relegate to the vague region of 'representation' a large proportion of our pains and almost all of our pleasures, — a proceeding to which there are many objections which I shall touch upon later.

2. In the experiments which are commonly made in the laboratory, it is found that electrical and direct mechanical stimulations of nerve trunks, or of their terminals in certain spots, give pain, but that no sort of manipulation of these stimulations which has been tried has brought pleasure. From this it is argued that, as pleasure cannot be obtained by the activities of the nerves in question and as pain can be, there must be specific nerves for pain. But it seems to me that we may argue from the facts to a quite different conclusion, viz.: that the nature of the electrical or mechanical stimulus applied is such that it is always productive of the conditions of pain and that therefore pleasure cannot be reached through the activity of these particular nerve trunks or terminals unless they be stimulated by other less abnormal methods than those thus far adopted by the ordinary experimenter. This view is strengthened by evidence which we have that certain nerves have a very limited capacity for action under the conditions which make pleasure production possible. In certain directions we must have a summation of gentle stimulations if pleasure is to be noticed. The delicious softness of down and the agreeable smoothness of satin cannot be appreciated unless broad surfaces are affected at one time. It is even possible, indeed, that certain sensational nerves may be practically incapable of reacting under the conditions which pleasure implies. Surely from these facts we gain no convincing argument in favor of specific pain nerves.

Under the view that I have above suggested there is no difficulty in accounting for the fact that the inner organs, of which we