Page:Philosophical Review Volume 1.djvu/663

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No. 6.]
PLEASURE-PAIN AND SENSATION.
647

inner sensations are accounted for by supposing that these organs, being very regular in their action and not ordinarily called upon to react to unusual stimuli, lose practically the storage capacity; so that a strong stimulus always brings pain, as it also first brings into prominence in consciousness the psychic elements to which the pain is attached. The theory accounts for the fact that the well-rested and vigorous man finds pleasure-getting easy; for with him storage must be large and the capacity for pleasure-getting full: and also for the fact that one weakened by excessive activity or illness finds pleasure-getting impossible; his illness or overwork has drained away all his surplus stored force.

16. That localization should be dim for pleasure-pain is not surprising since the organs of pleasure and those of pain are so constantly shifting.

17. The difficulty as to representation does not occur under our theory; for no such thing as a representation of a pain or pleasure is supposed, although pleasurable and painful representations are acknowledged and are covered by the general law.

Here my argument must close. There is much evidence corroborative of the general theory I have here advocated, which I cannot present within the limits of this article, and no more indeed is called for in this connection than bears especial reference to the sensational hypothesis. If any reader be interested, he will find a fuller treatment of the subject in the numbers of Mind above referred to and in a series of articles now appearing in the same journal, in which the important subject of Æsthetics is treated from the standpoint of my hypothesis. I cannot lay down my pen, however, without one word more. Introspective psychology in our day cannot take any steps without inquiring whether they are in accord with the results reached by our new-born science of psycho-physics. On the other hand, if there be any force whatever in the argument for the thorough-going coincidence of psychic and neural phenomena, investigators in psycho-physics on their part must also take into account the records of introspective psychology. The mass of observations from introspection is large in comparison