Page:Philosophical Review Volume 1.djvu/703

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No. 6.]
SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.
687

tions is not obviated by the more frequent repetition of one of them. Pathological observation shows also that learning anew what has been completely forgotten may be much easier than the first acquirement without being accompanied by a gleam of recognition. And when the intensity of Gefühlston depends on quantity, as in smell and taste, the change due to former functioning would not make itself felt. Moreover, a change in Gefühlston cannot of itself constitute a bond of associative reproduction. There must be already in some other way the idea that the accented sensation is not a first but a repeated experience. This idea, which forms the essence of every recognition, then joins itself by simultaneity to the peculiar Gefühlston, and every future association is founded on contiguity. With every presentation there are accompanying activities, which, owing to feeble excitation, insufficient attention, or other cause, either remain below the threshold of consciousness, or, under favorable conditions, become distinct elements. These it is which, setting themselves in antithesis to those of the present presentation, aid in distinguishing between this and the earlier one. But as in the case of Gefühlston due to repetition, the peculiar accent accompanying the wavering back and forth of these elements over the threshold of consciousness cannot of itself produce recognition of a past presentation. Again, there must be the idea that this mark is attached to presentations which have entered consciousness before. And this last is given through the simple reproduction of contiguous elements. Immediate recognition arises only after mediate apprehension of a presentation as known, accompanied by the peculiar coloring which distinguishes it from that sensation as belonging to the past. But although immediate recognition is thus a complex association-process, it is explained by reference to the one principle of contiguous association in its two phases.

Zur Psychologie der Landschaft. R. Wlassak. V. f. w. Ph., XVI, 3, pp. 333-354.

The effect of landscape upon the mind is characterized by a peculiar feeling of significance not explained by the separate objects that meet the eye. What is the content of this unexplained element? The basal feeling in landscape-presentation is that of environment pure and simple — of the not-me. This element is due to nature's independence of us — an independence not ascribed to the walls and furniture of our rooms. But the awe or fear naturally accompanying the sense of outwardness is modified by the fact that a landscape does not confine our thoughts, which may pass at will into the illimitable beyond; thus the scene becomes after all an extension of ourself. The sense of meaning