That the Beautiful is part of 'the Real,' i.e., is always 'the True,' using the term True in the broader sense, is not questioned; and that, in my view, is the theoretical truth recognized by the aesthetic realists. But in practice the aesthetic realist maintains that the Beautiful is always the True, using the term True in the narrow sense; and in this, in my view, lies his error.
And if the relation of the Beautiful to the True demands the attention of the philosopher, equally so does the relation of the Beautiful to the Good. As I look upon it, all of the True (using the term as above explained in the narrow sense) and all of the Good, so far as either involve relatively permanent pleasure of impression, are possible elements of beauty. But, on the other hand, it seems clear that neither the True (still using the term in the narrower sense) nor the Good is necessarily pleasing, but may be unpleasant; and therefore either of them may be an element of ugliness, and as such must lose all possibility of becoming an element in the Beautiful.
One further word, in closing, upon the closely allied question as to the nature of worth-values. There is a worth-value involved in the Good, and a worth-value involved in the True, and a worth-value involved in the Beautiful ; and each of these worth-values in itself seems to be involved with pleasure-getting. Now if this is the case, then, under the theory I uphold, any worth-value should be a possible aesthetic element, and this I think it will be granted is true. But the distinctions between these worth-values are on different planes, as it were. In the case of the worth-value of the Good, we appreciate the worth-pleasure within the realm of the real of expression, i. e., of impulse. In the case of the worth -value of the True (in the narrow sense), we appreciate the worth-pleasure within the realm of the real in other fields than that of expression or that of impression. In the case of the worth-value of the Beautiful, we appreciate the worth-pleasure within the realm of the real of impression; i.e., we appreciate, with pleasure, the significance for life of the existence of relatively permanent pleasure, in and for itself.
