men living entirely for the future. The source of the feeling called moral obligation is now indicated. The essential trait being the control of some feelings by some other feelings, Mr. Spencer traces the different species of control from without, in political government, religious fear, and the general influence of society. All these have evolved with society, as means of social self-preservation. The penalties accompanying them impart the feeling of coercion; in other words, the sense of moral obligation. At the same time we are not to exclude from the aggregate the earlier and deeper element of self-regarding prudence, based on the penalties of improvidence. But now the moral motive, arising' at first from external sources, is destined to transformation when the individual mind is completely accommodated to the social situation. The higher actions required for the harmonious carrying on of life will be as much matters of course as are those lower actions prompted by the simple desires.
The Sociological view, already implied, is the supplement of the physical, the biological, and the psychological views. It teaches the modes of conduct for reducing individual antagonisms, and bringing about mutual coöperation. Out of this, by necessary deduction, we obtain the reasons for fulfilling contracts, for assigning benefits in proportion to services, which is Justice; and further for the rendering of gratuitous services, in a certain degree, which is Beneficence. We see how social life is furthered, not merely by mutual abstinence from harm, but by exchange of services beyond agreement.
In a separate chapter, entitled "Criticisms and Explanations," Mr. Spencer compares his deductive theory of conduct with the utilitarian computation, as handled by Bentham, Mill, and Sidgwick. I will return to this on completing the survey of his entire scheme. His next chapter is an illustration of the dependence of pleasures and pains on the state of the organism, and is equally necessary for his purpose, as being the completion of the theory of pleasure. People have often supposed that pleasurable agents, such as sugar to the taste, are so by intrinsic and absolute quality, the same to all persons in all situations. This is soon shown to be a mistake; and the opposite truth is one of great importance in the ethical point of view. Physical pain is immensely greater in a highly developed nervous system. Exercises that give great pleasure to some creatures give none to others; the system being in the one case adapted to them, and in the others not. Emotions presuppose a suitable organization. Destructiveness will give way to amity, if the nervous arrangements for one are atrophied by disuse, and those for the other persistently exercised. The civilized man is distinguished by contracting the same delight in peaceful industry as the savage feels in war and the chase.
The next two chapters—"Egoism versus Altruism" and "Altruism versus Egoism"—are the most incisive in the whole book. The relation of altruism to egoism is subject to habitual exaggeration even to
