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Page:Popular Science Monthly Volume 18.djvu/403

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we produce changes, is the correlative of that universal power which transcends consciousness. And then he ends the criticisms forming the second part of his work by saying, "If this is not materialistic I do not know what is." He does not do this by inadvertence, though there would be little excuse even then; but he does it deliberately and with his eyes open. His next chapter begins:

"It will have been observed that in the preceding part of this criticism I have employed the term 'matter in motion,' and have avoided the use of the word 'force,' although it appears so prominently in the pages of Mr. Spencer's work. This has not been accidental, but by design, indicating as it does one of my main criticisms of Mr. Spencer.

"I can logically take up one of two positions. The first recognizes matter, whose properties are merely those of extension, which are capable of being described in terms of geometry and arithmetic. I can also recognize as the sole active properties of matter its modes and rates of motion—the motion, that is to say, of ultimate units, atoms, molecules, or masses, also capable of measurement.

"The second position recognizes matter and its activity or activities—matter as endowed with force or forces."

Thus it will be observed that having avowedly dealt with matter and motion as modes of force, I am "by design" criticised as though I had not so dealt with them. Having distinctly said what I mean by matter and motion, I am practically told that I shall not mean that, but shall mean what Mr. Guthrie means; and shall be dealt with accordingly. And then, further, it will be observed that of the two positions which Mr. Guthrie lays down as possible, and proceeds to argue upon as alternatives, one or other of which I must accept, both speak of matter and units of matter as though actually existing under the forms thought by us; and the last, speaking of "matter as endowed with force or forces," implies that whether in mass or in units, matter is a space-occupying something which is in the one case inert and in the other case made active by force with which it is "endowed" force which is added to the inert something. Spite of all the pains I have taken to show that I regard matter as itself a localized manifestation of force—spite of all the evidence that our idea of a unit of matter, or atom, is regarded by me simply as a symbol which the form of our thought obliges us to use, but which we can not suppose answers to the reality without committing ourselves to alternative impossibilities of thought, I am debited with the belief that matter actually consists "of space-occupying units, having shape and measurement." Though I have repeatedly made it clear that our ideas of matter, motion, and force are but the x, y, and z with which we work our equations, and formulate the various relations among phenomena in such way as to express their order in terms of x, y, and z though I have shown that the realities for which x, y, and z stand can not be conceived by us as