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THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY.

for fearlessness of the consequences—my only apprehension in that respect being, that any arguments I may present, unrelieved by interesting experiments, will not excite sufficient interest to provoke either commendation or censure.

I think, however, I may properly say that, viewing the problem on the spiritual side, and carefully excluding popular prepossessions and theological dogmas, I have carried the opposite doctrine of "freedom" to its legitimate logical consequences in the conclusion that every being that wills is a creative first cause, having, in virtue of its attributes of knowledge, feeling, and volition, a power of itself to begin action. That the object of every volition or effort is to make the future different from what it otherwise would be, and hence, that every such being is an independent, self-active power in the universe, freely doing its part and coöperating with all other active intelligences in creating the future, which is always the composite result of the action of all such intelligences: that even an oyster, though it have no other power than that of moving its shell, may, so far, create the future and make it different from what it otherwise would be; and further, that as every intelligent being will conform its action to the conditions under, or upon, which it is to act, the action of each, in changing the conditions, may affect the action of any or of all others, and the action of the lowest may, in this way, influence that of the highest.

We both, however, admit knowledge and feeling, and recognize consciousness, or the phenomena of knowing, in man and other animals. In discussing questions so fundamental, this must be largely relied upon for the foundation and support of the argument on either side, and I will briefly state my views in regard to its authority.

Mind, as manifested in man and in brutes, I regard as entirely made up of a capacity for knowledge, a susceptibility to feeling, and a faculty of effort (will); this last being the only power we possess; and if it—the effort of intelligent being—is not the only power known to us, it is at least that power, of the existence of which we have the most direct and reliable evidence. The recipient and receptacle of all our knowledge, whatever its source, is consciousness. Our conscious perceptions and feelings (including emotions) are the foundation of all knowledge, and all belief; but the consciousness of one man, of itself, avails nothing against another having a different consciousness and a different belief. Belief is not a matter of will or of choice, but each must believe in conformity to his own consciousness, and retain his existing belief till his consciousness is in some way changed. The denial of this involves a contradiction, and we may assume, as a corollary to it, that it is not only reasonable, but a necessity, that we believe things to be as they appear to be, till we recognize a sufficient reason for believing that the appearances are deceptive. The testimony of consciousness is not equally reliable as to all subjects. In some cases it is conclusive, in others far from it. In regard to our internal percep-