Page:Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election.pdf/148

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U.S. Department of Justice

Attorney Work Product // May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)

and having Yanukovych, the Ukrainian President ousted in 2014, elected to head that republic.[1] That plan, Manafort later acknowledged, constituted a "backdoor" means for Russia to control eastern Ukraine.[2] Manafort initially said that, if he had not cut off the discussion, Kilimnik would have asked Manafort in the August 2 meeting to convince Trump to come out in favor of the peace plan, and Yanukovych would have expected Manafort to use his connections in Europe and Ukraine to support the plan.[3] Manafort also initially told the Office that he had said to Kilimnik that the plan was crazy, that the discussion ended, and that he did not recall_Kilimnik asking Manafort to reconsider the plan after their August 2 meeting.[4] Manafort said Grand Jury     that he reacted negatively to Yanukovych sending—years later—an "urgent" request when Yanukovych needed him.[5] When confronted with an email written by Kilimnik on or about December 8, 2016, however, Manafort acknowledged Kilimnik raised the peace plan again in that email.[6] Manafort ultimately acknowledged Kilimnik also raised the peace plan in January and February 2017 meetings with Manafort.Grand Jury [7]

Second, Manafort briefed Kilimnik on the state of the Trump Campaign and Manafort's plan to win the election.[8] That briefing encompassed the Campaign's messaging and its internal polling data. According to Gates, it also included discussion of "battleground" states, which Manafort identified as Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Minnesota.[9] Manafort did not refer explicitly to "battleground" states in his telling of the August 2 discussion, Grand Jury 
 
 [10]


    prime minister. The plan emphasized that Yanukovych would be an ideal candidate to bring peace to the region as prime minister of the republic, and facilitate the reintegration of the region into Ukraine with the support of the U.S. and Russian presidents. As noted above, according to GJ  the written documentation describing the plan, for the plan to work, both U.S. and Russian support were necessary. Grand Jury  2/21/18 Email, Manafort, Ward, & Fabrizio, at 3-5.

  1. Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 4; Grand Jury   
  2. Grand Jury 
  3. Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 4.
  4. Manafort 9/12/18 302, at 4.
  5. Grand Jury  Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 5; Manafort 9/12/18 302, at 4.
  6. Manafort 9/12/18 302, at 4; Investigative Technique  
  7. Grand Jury   Documentary evidence confirms the peace-plan discussions in 2018. 2/19/18 Email, Fabrizio to Ward (forwarding email from Manafort); 2/21/18 Email, Manafort to Ward & Fabrizio.
  8. Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 5.
  9. Gates 1/30/18 302, at 3, 5.
  10. Grand Jury 

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