Page:Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election.pdf/184

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U.S. Department of Justice

~~Attorney Work Product~~ // ~~May Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)~~

the releases, the defendants used the Guccifer 2.0 persona to disseminate documents through WikiLeaks. On July 22, 2016, WikiLeaks released over 20,000 emails and other documents that the hacking conspirators had stolen from the DNC, Netyksho Indictment ¶ 48. In addition, on October 7, 2016, WikiLeaks began releasing emails that some conspirators had stolen from Clinton Campaign chairman John Podesta after a successful spearphishing operation. Netyksho Indictment ¶ 49.

Harm to Ongoing Matter
Grand Jury
Harm to Ongoing Matter

⁠b. Charging Decision As to Harm to Ongoing Matter

Harm to Ongoing Matter
^[1]Harm to Ongoing Matter

↑ The Office also considered, but ruled out, charges on the theory that the post-hacking sharing and dissemination of emails could constitute trafficking in or receipt of stolen property under the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314 and 2315. The statutes comprising the NSPA cover "goods, wares, or merchandise," and lower courts have largely understood that phrase to be limited to tangible items since the Supreme Court's decision in Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985), See United States v. Yijia Zhang, 995 F. Supp. 2d 340, 344-48 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (collecting cases). One of those post-Dowling decisions—United States v. Brown, 925 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1991)—specifically held that the NSPA does not reach "a computer program in source code form," even though that code was stored in tangible items (i.e, a hard disk and in a three-ring notebook). Id. at 1302-03. Congress, in turn, cited the Brown opinion in explaining the need for amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) that "would ensure that the theft of intangible information by the unauthorized use of a computer is prohibited in the same way theft of physical items [is] protected." S. Rep. 104-357, at 7 (1996). That sequence of events would make it difficult to argue that hacked emails in electronic form, which are the relevant stolen items here, constitute "goods, wares, or merchandise" within the meaning of the NSPA.

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[1] The Office also considered, but ruled out, charges on the theory that the post-hacking sharing and dissemination of emails could constitute trafficking in or receipt of stolen property under the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314 and 2315. The statutes comprising the NSPA cover "goods, wares, or merchandise," and lower courts have largely understood that phrase to be limited to tangible items since the Supreme Court's decision in Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985), See United States v. Yijia Zhang, 995 F. Supp. 2d 340, 344-48 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (collecting cases). One of those post-Dowling decisions—United States v. Brown, 925 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1991)—specifically held that the NSPA does not reach "a computer program in source code form," even though that code was stored in tangible items (i.e, a hard disk and in a three-ring notebook). Id. at 1302-03. Congress, in turn, cited the Brown opinion in explaining the need for amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) that "would ensure that the theft of intangible information by the unauthorized use of a computer is prohibited in the same way theft of physical items [is] protected." S. Rep. 104-357, at 7 (1996). That sequence of events would make it difficult to argue that hacked emails in electronic form, which are the relevant stolen items here, constitute "goods, wares, or merchandise" within the meaning of the NSPA.

[1]