also attempted to carry on propaganda on the enemy fronts. In the East, the Russians were the authors of their own collapse, and our work there was of secondary importance. In the West, the fronts of our enemies had not been made susceptible by the state of public opinion in their home countries, and the propaganda we gradually introduced had no success.…Germany failed in the fight against the moral of the enemy peoples."
Again and again Ludendorff quotes instances of the effect of propaganda. For example, just before the last German offensive of July 15, 1918:
"The Army complained of the enemy propaganda. It was the more effective because the Army was rendered impressionable by the attitude at home.…The enemy propaganda had seized on Prince Lichnowsky's pamphlet, which, in a way that I myself could not explain, placed on the German Government the responsibility for the outbreak of war. And this, though his Majesty and the Chancellor again and again asserted that the Entente was responsible.…
The Army was literally drenched with enemy propaganda publications. Their great danger to us was clearly recognised.
