Early was fortunately able to supply,) "that it was General Lee's intention to attack the enemy on the 2nd of July as early as practicable, and it is my opinion that he issued orders to that effect." In letters published in the Southern Historical Society Papers for August and September, 1877, General Long gives various details which demonstrate that General Lee expected Longstreet to attack early in the morning of the 2nd; that, at 10 o'clock, "General Lee's impatience became so urgent that he proceeded in person to hasten the movements of Longstreet; that he was met by the welcome tidings that Longstreet's troops were in motion; and that, after further annoying delays, at 1 o'clock P. M. General Lee's impatience again urged him to go in quest of Longstreet." Col. Walter H. Taylor, of General Lee's staff, whose letter General Longstreet gives to show that he did not hear the order for an early attack, says, in his article published in the Southern Historical Society Papers for September, 1877, "it is generally conceded that General Longstreet on this occasion was fairly chargeable with tardiness;" that he had been urged the day before by General Lee "to hasten his march;" and, that, on the morning of the 2nd, "General Lee was chafed by the non-appearance of the troops, until he finally became restless and rode back to meet General Longstreet and urge him forward."
General Lindsay Walker, chief-of-artillery of Hill's corps, in a letter to me, says:
Letter from General R. Lindsay Walker.
General Fitz. Lee:
My Dear Sir: I cheerfully comply with a request to give you the following brief statement:
I was, at Gettysburg, as I continued to be to the surrender at Appomattox Courthouse, chief of artillery of the Third corps, (Lieutenant-General A. P. Hill, commanding,) and it was, therefore, necessary for me to know on the evening of the 1st of July what dispositions of my artillery to make for the next day. I have a strong impression that I heard General Lee say that evening that be wished the battle opened at the earliest possible moment the next morning by a simultaneous attack on both flanks, and
