mitted to him for decision. He was in Atlanta, and in his absence the hazard of leaving an interval of one and a half miles in a line intended to be continuous, and at a point in front of which the enemy was in force and might at any time attack, seemed to me too great to be assumed. The attack thus delayed was, therefore, made at four P. M. instead of at one o'clock.
My troops were formed as follows: Bate's division on the right; Walker's in the centre; Cheatham's, commanded by Brigadier-General Maney, on the left, and Cleburne's in reserve. The command moved to the attack in echelon of division from the right. Walker's division, in consequence of the circular formation of the enemy's fortifications, encountered them first and was repulsed and driven back. Bate, finding no enemy in his immediate front, was directed to find and, if practicable, to turn their flank; but his advance, through an almost impenetrable thicket, was necessarily slow. Expecting but not hearing Bate's guns, I ordered Maney and Cleburne (whose division had been substituted for Walker's beaten troops) to attack. At the moment when the troops were advancing to the assault, I received information from General Hood that the enemy were passing and overlapping the extreme right of the army, accompanied by an imperative order to send him a division at once. In obedience to this order, I immediately withdrew and sent to him Cleburne's division. The withdrawal of a division at the moment when but two were available compelled me to countermand the assault, and the lateness of the hour, which made it impossible to get Bate in position to attack before dark, left no alternative but to give up the attack altogether. These movements and their causes were fully explained to General Hood at the time, and seemingly to his entire satisfaction.
No mention is made in General Hood's report of the fight made by Cleburne on the 21st, which he described as the "bitterest" of his life. But it was the well known and often expressed opinion of that noble and lamented officer, that but for the withdrawal of his division, which prevented the assault on the 20th, and its timely arrival on the right, the enemy would, on the morning of the 21st, have succeeded in gaining the inner works of Atlanta.
On the 21st of July, General Hood decided to attempt on the following day to turn the enemy's left flank.
The original plan was to send my corps by a detour to Decatur, to turn the enemy's position; but my troops had been marching, working and fighting the night and day previous, had had little rest for thirty-six hours, and it was deemed impracticable to make so long a march in time to attack on the following day. This plan was therefore abandoned, and General Hood decided to strike the enemy in flank.
General Hood says: "Hardee failed to entirely turn the enemy's flank as directed, took position and attacked his flank." In proof that General Hood's instructions were obeyed, I have only to mention that when my dispatch, informing him of the position I had
