road was densely wooded. General Stanley had come up on the left of Davis, and was deploying, though there could not have been on his front more than a skirmish line. Had he moved straight on by the flank, or by a slight detour to his left, he would have enclosed the whole ground occupied by Hardee's corps, and that corps could not have escaped us; but night came on and Hardee did escape" (Memoirs, volume II, pages 107-108).
General Sherman might have spared these regrets; for Hardee had anticipated, and, as far as his means would allow, had provided against this very movement; and Stanley would have encountered in his front a force, numerically weak, it is true, but strong enough no doubt to have held him the length of time necessary.
General Hood meantime was taking Hardee's situation very coolly. Referring to his march out of Atlanta at 5 P. M. the same day, he says (page 208):
"Upon our uninterrupted march, information reached me that Hardee's corps was engaged with a large force of the enemy. His position upon a ridge, with an open country in rear, relieved me from special anxiety in regard to the safety of himself and command. Lieutenant-General Stewart, nevertheless, was instructed to hastened forward to his support, and General Lee to follow promptly with his corps. When these reinforcements reached the scene of action, the contest had ceased."
The contest referred to was at Jonesboro' on the 1st of September, and no reinforcements reached the scene of action during after that contest. Stewart and Lee formed a junction with Hardee afterward at Lovejoy's station, on the evening of the 2d or morning of the 3d of September.
General Hood's report of this engagement is a fair illustration of his animus towards Hardee. We have seen how critical Hardee's situation was, how gallantly the troops fought, how boldly and skilfully they were handled, and how narrowly the corps escaped capture or destruction. General Hood in his official report describes and disposes of it in these words: "On the 1st of September Hardee's corps was attacked in position at Jonesboro'. The result was the loss of eight guns and some prisoners."
Two incidents occurred at Jonesboro' which illustrate the esprit de corps of Hardee's troops, which General Hood says were "the best troops in the army." When the salient occupied by Govan was carried, Granberry, who was in single rank on the left, found his position enfiladed and turned, and began to draw back his right. Hardee, who was for the moment prevented by a screen of woods from seeing what had befallen Govan, now saw Granberry's right
