leisure, to take up in detail this whole question of relative mortality, and to show that although these figures (compiled by Federal not Confederate officials), may not be fully accurate in every particular, yet if they fail at all it is in not representing the matter as favorably to the Confederates as the facts warrant.
5. Professor Richardson candidly admits that "a review of the whole case makes it certain that the United States Government was responsible for the failure of exchanges during the last year of the war, and that to its policy in this matter it owes, in a large measure, its final success." [Italics ours.] He justifies this as a war measure, condemns the Government for not frankly avowing this policy, and concludes his article with the following tribute to the Federal soldiers who died in prison: "Whether there was not a possibility of a Waterloo or Sadowa on the Rapidan instead of an 'attrition' campaign continued through a year will always remain an interesting question. But at any rate, as the course of events actually turned, the men who languished at Andersonville played, in their sufferings and death, a most essential part in the campaign. This part was not so stirring as charging on the guns, or meeting in the clash of infantry lines, but their enforced, long-continued hardship made it possible for mere superiority of numbers to decide the struggle, and for the Confederacy to crumble without its Waterloo, and to terminate its existence by the surrender of those less than eight thousand muskets at Appomattox."
Now all this is exceedingly candid and fair, but we beg to remind the Professor of some additional points which are needed to complete the proper understanding of the whole question, (a). In January, 1864, Judge Ould, our commissioner of exchange, proposed to General Hitchcock, the Federal agent, that surgeons from both sides should be allowed to attend their own prisoners, and that these surgeons should be allowed to receive from their governments or friends, and distribute for the comfort of prisoners, contributions of money, food, clothing, and medicines. To this humane proposal no reply was ever made.
(b.) The Federal Government having declared medicines "contraband," our authorities proposed to buy from them medicines and hospital stores, which they pledged themselves should only be used for Federal prisoners, and pay for them in gold, cotton or tobacco, as they might prefer. This proposition was refused.
(c.) They failed to avail themselves of our offer to allow their surgeons to come and bring medicines and supplies, and minister to their prisoners in our hands, even though we were denied a like privilege of ministering to our poor fellows in their hands.
