Campaign of 1864 and 1865. 557
were to rush upon the work simultaneously. There was a deep ravine, which ran within a hundred yards of the face which .Hoke was to attack. Up this he could form and have his troops com- pletely masked. On my side the ground was a level plain, and conse- quently I could not form nearer than five hundred yards of the work. When the artillery fire was nearly over and the time for making the assault had nearly arrived, I directed General Anderson, commanding my leading brigade, to move up as close as possible to the work and let his men lay down, so as at the proper moment to spring up and reach the work simultaneously with Hoke, who had much less dis- tance to charge than I. General Anderson failing to inform his men of his intention, they mistook the advance for an assault, and instead of halting and laying down rushed forward to attack. This brigade being in for it, necessitated my pushing Bratton and Perry to its assistance. Hoke, though aware that I was attacking prema- turely, waited for the moment agreed upon, and thus the concentrated fire of the fort was poured upon my troops. The attack was, of course, unsuccessful, and my loss very heavy. Though Hoke made an effort after awhile, it was then too late. Had General Anderson sufficiently instructed his men to wait for the proper moment, or had Hoke attacked when I did, even though it did anticipate the time a few moments (and the chances for success were quite as good then as they could have been afterwards), the result might have been very different. General Lee now determined to attack upon the flank. Accordingly, Hoke's and my division having been relieved in the trenches by the Richmond militia during the night of the 6th of October, daylight next morning found us massed on the Darby- town road. The enemy's right, consisting of Kautz's division of cavalry, rested on this road. My division having the advance, upon approaching our old exterior line of works, found Kautz with his division dismounted and with twelve or sixteen pieces of artillery behind them. Having previously detached Perry, who, with Gary's cavalry, was to turn the enemy's right and come in behind him with the rest of the division (Bratton leading), I assaulted in front. After a sharp fight of twenty minutes Kautz was routed, ten guns and caissons complete, and more than one hundred artillery and cavalry horses, being among the spoils. The enemy, being now perfectly aware of our force and intentions, massed about two miles to the rear of the point from which Kautz had been routed a large force of infantry and artillery behind breastworks, protected in front by a line of abattis. Hoke now came up and formed in line of battle on my
