130 Southern Historical Society Papers.
enter and occupy a portion of Tennessee, a victory gained by this army beyond the Potomac would, by threatening- the heart of the Northern States, compel their armies to fall back, free Ken- tucky, and give us the line of the Ohio within ten clays there- after. On the other hand, should our forces in Tennessee and Southern Kentucky be strengthened, so as to enable us to take and to hold the Ohio river as a boundary, a disastrous defeat of this army would at once be followed by an overwhelming- wave of Northern invaders, that would sweep over Kentucky and Tennessee, extending to the northern part of the cotton States, if not to New Orleans. Similar views were expressed in regard to ultimate results in Northwestern Virginia being de- pendent upon the success or failure of this army, and various other special illustrations were offered, showing, in short, that success here was success everywhere, defeat here defeat every- where; and that this was the point upon which all the available forces of the Confederate States should be concentrated.
It seemed to be conceded by all that our force at that time here was not sufficient for assuming the offensive beyond the Potomac, and that even with a much larger force an attack upon their army under the guns of their fortifications on this side of the river was out of the question.
The President asked me what number of men were necessary, in my opinion, to warrant an offensive campaign, to cross the Potomac, cut off the communications of the enemy with their fortified capital, and carry the war into their country. I an- swered, "Fifty thousand effective, seasoned soldiers," explaining that by seasoned soldiers I meant such men as we had here pres- ent for duty, and added that they would have to be drawn from the Peninsula, about Yorktown, Norfolk, from Western Virginia, Pensacola, or wherever might be most expedient.
General Johnston and General Beauregard both said that a force of sixty thousand such men would be necessary, and that this force would require large additional transportation and munitions of war, the supplies here being entirely inadequate for an active campaign in the enemy's country even with our present force. In this connection there was some discussion of the difficulties to be overcome and the probabilities of success, but no one questioned the disastrous results of remaining inactive
