Page:Southern Historical Society Papers volume 39.djvu/125

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Review of " From Manassas to Appomattox." 113

vision, and said that he wished him to deploy without being seen by the enemy ; that the line pointed out was that which he occupied when the attack began between 3 and 4 P. M., and that "Longstreet was then walking back and forth some distance from General Lee, but came up, and, pointing to the map, showed me how he wanted the division located, to which General Lee replied, 'No, general, I wish it placed just the opposite,' " and that "Longstreet appeared as if he were irritated and an- noyed." It is a most significant circumstance that General Long- street makes no allusion in his memoirs to a letter which he quoted in the Philadelphia Weekly Times. This letter, written by General Hood, one of his divisional commanders, runs as follows :

'T arrived in front of the heights of Gettysburg shortly after daybreak on the morning of July 2. During the early part of the same morning we were both in company with General Lee.

  • * * General Lee was seemingly anxious you (Longstreet)

should attack that morning. You thought it better to await the arrival of Pickett's division — at that time still in the rear — in order to make the attack, and you said to me subsequently. The general is a little nervous this morning; he wishes me to make the attack ; I do not wish to do so without Pickett. I never like to go into battle with one boot oflf.' Thus passed the forenoon of that eventful day."

In our opinion General Longstreet has failed altogether to shift the burden of the responsibility for delay from his own shoulders. He was aware that Lee was anxious to attack as early as practicable. He was aware that an early attack was essential to success. He was aware how the commander-in- chief desired his divisions should be placed ; and yet until he received a definite order to advance did absolutely nothing. He made no attempt to reconnoitre his line of march, to bring his troops into position, or to initiate the attack in accordance with the expressed intentions of his superior.

His conduct on the third day opens up a still graver issue. The First Army Corps, when at length, on the afternoon of