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Southern Historical Society Papers.

the morning of July 2d against the Federal left, but he sought General Lee and objected to his plan and entered into an argument to convince him that it was faulty. General Sorrell, who was his chief of staff, in his account of the battle says that "Longstreet did not want to fight on the ground or on the plan adopted by the General-in-Chief." He made determined objection. General Sorrell, (p. 166), says "he failed to conceal some anger, and he continues "there was apparent apathy that lacked the fire and point of his usual bearing on the battlefield." Warm as was General Sorrell's admiration for General Longstreet he cannot conceal his disapprobation at his delay; he says, "On the 2d, quite late, 4 P. M., Longstreet made his long deferred attack on the enemy's left. * * * He gained ground rapidly and almost carried Round Top; but the morning delay was fatal. The enemy had been heavily reinforced while we were pottering around in sullen inactivity. Undoubtedly it was Lee's intention to make the attack in the forenoon, and support it by strong movements of Hill and Ewell." (p. 168).

Had he made an early attack it is absolutely certain that he would have made himself master of the two Round Tops and that would have decided the battle. Had he even attacked promptly after 11 o'clock, when he acknowledges he received a positive order to attack, there is every reason to have anticipated success. Even at the late hour when he finally did make his attack, 4 P. M., General Longstreet had an opportunity of seizing Round Top, but refused to embrace it. Scouts reported to General Hood that Round Top was unoccupied and that there were no troops in the rear. This intelligence was corroborated by prisoners. Hood sent three officers in succession to Longstreet to urge that he have permission to make the move on the Federal left, which would give him Round Top, but he doggedly refused, saying that "General Lee had ordered the attack to be made on the Emmitsburg road."

On this Colonel Henderson says: "His summary message to the divisional commander to carry out the original plan at least lays him open to the suspicion that although he was pre-