rid of without great difficulty. But we are not here providing against a mere temporary danger. Unfortunately it is but too probable that from the condition of the country, as the civil war has left it, similar complications will arise in the future, not indeed at every Presidential election, but from time to time. Moreover every thinking man will admit that the makers of the Constitution, when framing that vague provision concerning the counting of the electoral votes, did certainly not foresee and contemplate the case of disputed electoral votes, and of a Presidential election depending upon disputed votes. Had they foreseen it, no doubt they would have provided for it more clearly and carefully. Even in more peaceful times when the result of a Presidential election did not turn upon a single State, the indefiniteness of the Constitutional clause caused now and then much embarrassment and perplexity. It is evidently not adequate to the more difficult circumstances at present surrounding us. A change is therefore decidedly and urgently needed, and if that change must be recognized as necessary why should it not be taken in hand at once to help us through the threatening dangers of the present crisis?
Neither can it be denied that such a change would fail of its object if it did not withdraw the counting of the electoral votes, and the determination of the result from the struggle of political parties, and that this can be accomplished only by selecting for this office a tribunal standing above all party strife. Thus the Supreme Court seems clearly pointed out by the necessities of the case. There is only one other question requiring answer: Will not the discharge of such duties draw the Supreme Court itself into the struggle of parties? We believe not. Only once every four years are the electoral votes to be counted. In most cases the result is beyond all question decided, and the figures universally recognized before the counting