by a wrong interpretation of a clause originally inserted to safeguard him against just such injustice.
Moreover, if the gold clause were not thus assimilated to the new dollar great confusion would be introduced from the double reckoning. Probably the most extreme instance would be that of the insurance companies, the assets of which are invested largely in gold-clause bonds but the liabilities of which to their policy holders are payable in "lawful money." If the dollars used for measuring both assets and liabilities are to be made different, these companies might become either bankrupt or greatly enriched as a consequence.
It seems clear, therefore, that the solution here offered of the gold-clause problem is the justest, simplest, and most smoothly working of the various solutions which might be considered.
If, however, Congress should conclude that it was necessary to provide further against the possibility of any complaint, it could leave the contracting parties some choice in the matter. That is, the Act to stabilize the dollar could serve notice that stabilized dollars would be understood unless objections were raised by either contracting party between the date of the Act and the date on which the new system was to be put into effect. For cases where such objection was actually raised, the law could provide that the two parties to the contract might come to an agreement and further that, in case of their failure to do so, the creditor should have the right to choose, in advance, between the stabilized dollar and a dollar of bullion of the present weight and fineness. When this choice was made, it could not, of course, be altered afterward, even if, as would be quite possible, the creditor should find that he had chosen against his own interests.
The result would undoubtedly be that even the few contracting parties who would raise the question of the gold clause would find an easy way to settle it, while none of those who failed to raise the question could
