Page:The American Cyclopædia (1879) Volume VII.djvu/477

FREDERICKSBURG 465 side had about 100,000 across the river, besides his reserve on the other side. Burnside's final order was differently understood by the differ- ent commanders. Franklin supposed that he was to make a demonstration with only one of his eight divisions. Hooker supposed that there was to be a twofold attack, the main one by Sumner. Burnside's intent was that the main assault should be made by Franklin, sup- ported by one from Sumner, while Hooker should be ready to spring upon the enemy in his retreat. The fog lifted about 10 o'clock, and disclosed Franklin in motion. He had put a liberal construction upon his understanding of Burnside's order, and threw forward three divisions. Meade, who led the advance, pushed straight for what proved to be the centre of Jackson's position, held by the division of A. P. Hill. A considerable gap had been left at this point, and Meade struck this gap, hurl- ing the enemy to the right and left, piercing through the first line, and reaching the second. Gibbon, who was to support him, was a little slow, and before he came up the confederates had hurried to the point assailed, and Meade found himself opposed by threefold numbers. Assailed in front and on both flanks, he was swept back in some confusion over the ground which he had won. Gibbon now came up, and for a short time checked the pursuit ; but Jack- son was further reenforced from Longstreet's corps, and Gibbon and Meade were forced back almost to the river. Here the confederates encountered so severe a fire that they recoil- ed, and fell back to their old position on the heights. This put an end to the action on the Union left. The federals here lost about 3,700 in killed and wounded ; the confederates about 3,200. In the advance the federals had made about 500 prisoners, and lost as many in the retreat. In the mean time a more severe fight had been going on 3 m. to the right, where Sumner had assaulted the foot of Marye's hill. The strength of this position was wholly unknown to the assailants, and it was not till long after that they learned why it was that they were unsuccessful. Kershaw, one of the confederate generals, is the only one who gives any full account of it. He says : " Marye's hill, covered with batteries, falls off abruptly to- ward Fredericksburg to a stone wall which forms a terrace on the side of the hill and the outer margin of a road which winds along the foot of the hill. This road is about 25 ft. wide, and is faced by a stone wall about 4 ft. high on the city side. The road having been cut in the side of the hill in many places, this last wall is not visible above the surface of the ground." This sunken road was like the ditch of a fortress, affording complete protection to the troops in it. About 2,000 men occupied it, standing four deep. The crest of the hill was crowned by a battery of 11 12-pounders, and about 50 heavier guns were placed so as to enfilade all the approaches, which must be made over an open plain about 350 yards wide. The bulk of Lee's artillery was posted on the ridges in the rear, and out of action. Lee him- self does not seem to have been aware of the existence of this sunken road, which actually formed the strength of his position here. He seems to have assumed that the enemy would gam the crest of the hill, and that the real battle would be fought on the plateau beyond ; while Burnside assumed that when the crests were gained the battle would be won. The attack was made here by the two divisions of French and Hancock, French in the advance. His men moved across the narrow plain, galled by a fire from the confederate batteries. Half way across they came within range of the men in the sunken road, who poured in a solid sheet of musketry fire, before which the heads of the columns melted away, and the whole fell back, leaving half of their numbers behind. Hancock now advanced, until he came within range of the musketry from the sunken road. The front was so narrow that only a single brigade could be put in at once. Brigade after brigade took the places of those which had been driven back, so rapidly that this action, which lasted three hours, as seen from the heights of Falmouth, looked like a single con- tinuous assault. French and Hancock brought 10,000 men into action, of whom 4,000 were cut down. Burnside had watched this action from the heights across the Kappahannock, and had seen the troops which were to carry the hill swept back from its base. Still he was determined that the heights should be carried, and he ordered Hooker to renew the attempt. Hooker crossed the river, examined the position, consulted with the officers who had been engaged, and returning remonstrated against the order. But Burnside was inflexible. Of his six divisions Hooker had but two with him. It was nearly night when he opened fire with all his artillery, hoping to make a breach ; but this sunken road was not to be touched by any fire. At sunset he ordered the division of Humphreys to charge with unloaded muskets, for there was no time to load and fire. As it happened, the confederate battery on the hill had exhausted its ammunition and gone to the rear to replenish, so that Humphreys was not exposed to the artillery fire by which French and Hancock had been so sorely galled, and his men went a few yards further than the others had gone. But they also met a solid sheet of fire from the sunken road, which drove them back. The assault lasted only a quarter of an hour, but in those few minutes, out of 4,000 men, nearly half fell, while it is doubtful whether the enemy lost a man. Hooker forbore to press the unavailing assault. " Having," he said, "lost as many men as my orders required me to lose, I suspended the attack, and directed that the men should hold for the advance line a ditch which would afford shelter." The confeder- ates lay upon their arms all that night, fully expecting another attack in the morning ; for, says Lee, " the attack had been so easily re-