the picture upside down, and found the pursuer liable for the price. " If I had been judge," says one of the company, " I should have made him pay double, for he had two pictures instead of one." Another story, even sillier than the last, gives rise to an interesting remark; namely, " that the office of a good magistrate is not to draw men into litigation, but rather to keep them out of it by every means, as Cato Censorius properly declared, when it was proposed in the Senate to decorate the Court and Auditorium of Rome, some proposing to construct galleries so as to keep the litigants under cover. Cato said it would be better to pave the courts and passages with pitfalls and man-traps, so as to keep the people out of them as much as possible."
The discussion rambles in a quaint way from point to point of the subject under review, and here and there we find passages which have an interest as contributions to the oft-renewed questions of advocacy which have been such favorites with ancient and modern philosophers alike. "Does not every one know," it is said, " that, among persons of sound judgment, the fluent speaking and eloquence of a fallacious orator are of no more account than the rouge of a coquette with which she adorns her face to appear more fascinating? Does not every one know that this art is nothing more than a deceit and a tyranny of the understanding? Who does not know that the Spartans rejected this art, saying that the speech of good men came not from art, but from the heart; and that Socrates judged no orator to be worthy of honor in a republic, no plague being more hurtful to a country than a fair-speaking orator when he made a bad use of his art, and of the sweetness of speech?" "One would not find so many advocates abusing the art of eloquence," says another guest, " in order to conceal the truth, surprise the judges, or so dazzle them as to prevent their separating the just from the unjust, if the example of the Athenians was renewed, who, after judgment given, and aware that an attempt had been made to beguile them, addressed themselves to the advocates and punished them rigorously. Even the Athenian Senate, the Areopagus, only permitted advocates simply to state the facts on either side, without using any embellishment to allure the judges. When the advocate was called, the usher forbade him to move the affections of the judges. And in order that the judges should not be diverted by any means from the truth, they heard criminal cases by night and in darkness." This, and the passage which follows, give us very curious ideas of ancient and mediaeval conceptions of justice. "The great King Francis was constrained to deprive accused persons of all assistance from counsel, seeing that their artifices only served to pervert justice. In all cases where there is a question of fact, the parties should be heard by word of mouth, as is done in the Merchant Courts." "All ordinances would be useless," said another, "if all advocates were imitators of the sanctity of Parpinian, who refused to defend his emperor, Caracalla, who was accused by the Senate of having massacred Geta, his brother. But nowadays manners are so corrupt, says Francois Grimaudet, that there is no murderer, thief, brigand, or robber, of whatever condition, or however wicked, who will not find, provided he has the money, an advocate who will boldly undertake to plead his cause. And if he cannot make it a good one, he will make it last so long that one may despair of seeing the end of it." As a salutary warning to the profession, the following anecdote is introduced:—
"A certain advocate of Milan was so cunning that he could make his cases last as long as he liked. Galeazzo, Duke of Milan, hearing of this, called the advocate to him, and said that he owed a thousand crowns to his baker, and wished to avoid paying him just then. The advocate assured him that he need not trouble himself about it for ten years to come, as the case would last all that time. The ungrateful Duke, when he came to know the artifices of his counsel, at once ordered the advocate to be hanged."
