what is far worse, however much the judge may err in his rulings, however openly or defiantly he may violate the rules of evidence, however much he may override all justice in his charge to the jury by misstatements of fact and of law, however deftly and cunningly he may mould by the bias of that charge the pliant minds of an ignorant jury, — in short, however unfairly the trial may have been conducted, yet there is no appeal, no court of re view, no redress. Were the issue involved a mere matter of so much money, or even of the owner ship of a sucking calf or a stray pig, the rulings of the trial court could be reviewed and justice be eventually secured; but as only the life of a human being is at stake, this " bloody old beast," which can find no better way of punishing its criminals than by choking them to death with the end of a rope, will listen to nothing of the sort. Such are the criminal courts of England in this year of our Lord 1889. In this country, were a judge to take the place of counsel by delivering such an argu ment to the jury as appears from all accounts to have been delivered by Mr. Justice Stephen in the Maybrick case, a court of review would set the verdict aside in about as little time as it took the jury to render it. Mrs. Maybrick may be guilty of deliberately poisoning her husband, and the ver dict may have been justified by the evidence (though we doubt it); nevertheless her conviction was by no means so necessary to the safety of human life in England as is a reform in the methods of English criminal trials. — Washington Law Reporter. By the Roman laws every advocate was re quired to swear that he would not undertake a cause which he knew to be unjust, and that he would abandon a defence which he should discover to be supported by falsehood or iniquity. (Cicero's oration pro Milone is a striking instance of the strict observance of this rule.) This is continued in Holland at this day; and if an advocate brings forward a cause there which appears to the Court clearly iniquitous, he is condemned in the costs of the suit. The examples will, of course, be very rare; more than one has, however, occurred within the memory of persons who are now living. The possible inconvenience that a cause just in itself might not be able to find a defender, is obviated in that country by an easy provision : a party who can find no advocate, and is neverthe
less persuaded of the validity of his cause, may • apply to the Court, which has in such cases a discretionary power of authorizing or appointing one. — Quarterly Review.
With reference to the suggestion that there should be a Court of Criminal Appeal in England, Baron Bramwell, one of the best-known English judges, in a letter to the London " Times " says : "Lord Esher writes to you that he ' has the strong est possible opinion that there should be a Court of Criminal Appeal.' I have the strongest possible opinion to the contrary. I do not say this to pit my opinion against his, but to show that it is not every one with some experience in the administra tion of the criminal law that thinks as he does, and to ask that public opinion may not be fixed till a fitting time and opportunity have enabled the matter to be properly discussed. I agree with the Lord Chancellor that the present is not a fitting time." Dr. Henry M. Scudder relates a case of Ori ental justice that could hardly be outdone for sharp and subtle discriminations. Four men, partners in business, bought some cotton-bales. That the rats might not destroy the cotton, they purchased a cat. They agreed that each of the four should own a particular leg of the cat; and each adorned with beads and other ornaments the leg thus appor tioned to him. The cat by an accident injured one of its legs. The owner of that member wound about it a rag soaked in oil. The cat going too near the fire set the rag on fire, and being in great pain rushed in among the cotton-bales, where she was accustomed to hunt rats. The cotton thereby took fire and was burned up. It was a total loss. The three other partners brought an action to recover the value of the cotton against the fourth partner, who owned the particular leg of the cat. The judge examined the case and decided thus : "The leg that had the oiled rag on it was hurt; the cat could not use that leg; in fact, it held up that leg and ran with the other three legs. The three unhurt legs therefore carried the fire to the cotton, and are alone culpable. The injured leg is not to be blamed. The three partners who owned the three legs with which the cat ran to the cotton will pay the whole value of the bales to the partner who was the proprietor of the injured leg."
