case to the referee; adding, however, a wise word of caution to the latter not to give any reasons for his conclusions, but simply to report his finding.1 So in a case 2 where a purchaser declined to accept, because part of the premises sold were in an undivided interest instead of in severalty, his lordship held him to his purchase prefacing his decision with his customary emphasis : " I am of opinion that the purchaser has been wrong from begining to end; " but the Court of Appeals thought otherwise. In another case 3 where two men had acted as directors without possessing the required qualification of shares, upon the question of their liability under the Compa nies' Act for a misfeasance, he commences : "Now, what is the case? Two gentlemen of the name of Coventry and Dixon, who are not the less aware of their liabilities because they happen to be lawyers of experience, are elected directors. . . . They took part in the management of the company, knowing they had no right to intervene at all. ... It does appear to me to be as plain a case of misfeasance ormisconduct as you can possibly state, and upon that point I think it too clear for argument. The next question I have to consider is whether I can reach these gentlemen, for I certainly will if I can, etc." And he did; declaring as the penalty that they should pay in to the company the price of loo shares, or £500 each. Unfor tunately his indignation carried him too far. The calmer sense of the Court of Appeals reversed his decision; James, L. J., saying : "With all deference to the Master of the Rolls and the strong opinion he has ex1 Dunkirk Co. v. Lever, 9 Ch. D. 20. - Arnold v, Arnold, 14 Ch. D. 470. 3 Coventry & Dixon's Case, 14 Ch. D. 660.
pressed in this case, we differ from his de cision. I am of opinion, speaking with all respect, that he has not been construing the act, but legislating for the purpose of putting a stop to a proceeding which is no doubt wrong." If it is not too extravagant a figure to use, these were but spots on the sun. His errors came from too keen a sense of justice, or an impatience with the formal delays of the law. We should, moreover, have given a very false impression if it were thought that he was in any way odd or grotesque. The bluntness which in a lesser man might have appeared so, was in him but the natural con comitant of his vigor. If he had " the nodosities of the oak," he had also its strength. Feeling deeply how liable the common law is to be devitalized by the in crustations of the past, he sought to free it from these and make it a living body in every member, organ, and articulation. To this end he devoted a capacity for work which has had few parallels, and with an un remitting faithfulness to the very last. As a judge of the first instance he heard and disposed of his daily list on Saturday, March 17, only four days before he died. As we remarked at the outset, this is no attempt to do justice to his great judicial qualities; for that would demand a volume, or at least a not inconsiderable number of his decisions given in full, with all the facts on which they were founded, and a topical survey of the doctrines involved; and the more closely we should scan his work the greater would he appear. He stands cer tainly not as the least imposing figure in a century that has seen such equity judges as Eldon, Cottenham, Wigram, Westbury, and Cairns.
