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which may reasonably be expected by author from reviewer, such as honesty, candor, intelligence, and a fair amount of breadth; but there is one thing which seems to be expected which is not reasonable, namely, anything worth the name of " review " from a critic in another State on a purely local treatise or digest. It is evident that generally in respect to these.the review must degenerate into a few formal words of commen dation or blame.
HUMOR IN LEGAL JOURNALISM. — It was to be expected when the "Green Bag" took up the idea of alleviating the austerities of the law with a little humor, and especially when it founded and endowed "The Lawyer's Easy Chair," that other legal jour nals would see the necessity of imitating it. We had hardly expected, however, to find an imitator in Eng land; but the grave " Law Times," which we believe once adjudicated that the occupant of this Chair "was never in earnest," has established what it calls "The Legal Humourist," — mind the », please! It is probably owing to the disadvantage of not living in England that we are unable thus far to discover any material difference between the contents of that de partment and the rest of the journal. The current instalment contains a rhymed version in the archaic style of a recent law case; some specimens of the customary dismal attempts of the English judges at wit, under the title of " Fun in Crime; " and a para graph about a solicitor who advertises eggs for sale. We are not jealous of these things. They merely make us sad, and do not make us wise. If we were to offer any advice to our playful brethren, it would be, in the language of the American tram-car ballad, "Punch, brother, punch with care."
NOTES OF CASES. INDIRECT SLANDER. — One may be slandered through his horse. Thus in Henkle v. Schaub (Michigan Supreme Court), 54 N. W. Repr. 293, a complaint alleging slander of plaintiff's stallion, which he kept for breeding, was held to be a slander of plaintiff's credit and reputation in that business, needing no allegation of special damage. The court said : — "The first question suggested by defendant's counsel is whether the action is for slandering the plaintiffs in their business, occupation, or calling, or an action for slandering the plaintiff's horse. It is admitted that if it be the former, then the words may he actionable per se, and the action could be maintained without alleging or proving special damages. On the other hand, it is in
sisted that if the action is upon the words spoken of and concerning plaintiffs' horse, then the words spoken are not actionable per sc, and no recovery could be had with out alleging and proving special damages. . . . The de claration plainly sets out the business and calling of the plaintiffs. As appears by the declaration, they are the ovners of this horse, which it is alleged is of the value of §2,000. It was imported from France, and recorded in the stud-book as a full, pure-blooded Percheron stal lion, which they had kept for breeding purposes from the year 1887 for hire and gain, and that he had begotten many colts; that he was a good colt-getter, and espe cially valuable to his owners. It is further alleged that the plaintiffs have represented and held out the horse as such, and that they (the plaintiffs) are upright and truth ful citizens, and of good standing in the country; that the defendant is also the owner of a stallion, and greatly envying the good standing and repute of plaintiffs, and wickedly and maliciously intending to injure them in their good name, fame, and credit, he made the false and malicious statements," etc. " It is apparent from the plain terms of the declaration that the action is based, not only upon the slander of the horse, but also bpon the character, fame, and credit of the plaintiffs, who are the owners thereof, and engaged in the business and calling of keeping the horse for hire, gain, and reward. The court was therefore iu error in holding that the declaration did not state a cause of action. The rule is well stated in Newell on Defamation, Slander, and I.ibel (at page 1811, as follows : ' When language is used concerning a person, or his affairs, which from its nature necessarily must, or presumably will, as its natural and proximate consequence, occasion him pecuniary loss, its publication prima facù constitutes a cause of action, and prima facie constitutes a wrong, without any allegation or evidence of damage other than that which is implied or presumed from the facts of publication; and this is all that is meant by the terms "actionable per sr" etc. Therefore the real, prac tical test by which to determine whether special damage must be alleged and proven in order to make out a cause of action for defamation is whether the language is such as necessarily must, or presumably will, occasion pecuni ary damage to the person of whom it is spoken.' The declaration was not demurred to, and the substance of a good declaration is certainly contained in these allega tions. Words, spoken or written, injurious to a person in his business, which are false and malicious, are action able per se, and special damages need not be alleged or proved. Manufacturing Co. •: Perkins, 78 Mich. I; Oliver v. Perkins (Mich.), 52 N. W. Rep. 613. What proofs the plaintiffs may be permitted to put in, if any, under the claim of slander to the horse, we need not now determine; but the declaration is sufficient to admit proof of the slander upon plaintiffs' business as it is framed."
MAY AND DECEMBER. — Their inability to agree is illustrated in Hoover v. Hoover (Kentucky Court of Appeals), 21 S. W. Rep. 234, the point of the decision being that if a husband sues for divorce on the ground of abandonment, and there is no alien ation of affection or guilty amour shown on the part
