of a vessel which project above the surface, such as coils of rope or chain, snubbing-blocks, capstans, hatchways, etc, and passengers are bound to take notice of them, and to avoid stumbling over them. We cannot consider that the mere presence of any of these necessary and usual appliances upon the deck of a vessel, if in ordinary and usual condition, confers any right of action upon a passenger who trips or stumbles over them. . . . "The case, then, is simply this : That a passenger on a steamboat stumbled over a gang-plank of ordinary con struction, and lying on the deck of the vessel in close proximity to the place where it must be used, and there was no proof that it was negligently or unusually con structed or handled, nor any other proof of any specific negligence of the defendant which produced the plaintiff's fall. We can only regard the case as a mere accident, not induced by negligence, and therefore without remedy in damages. In the case of Borough of Easton v. Ncff, 102 Pa. St. 474, an old lady stumbled or stepped into a gutter lying across the sidewalk of a street, and fell, and was in jured. She brought an action against the borough, and was bound to prove some specific negligence in order to recover. The court below left it to the jury to say whether there was any necessity for the construction of the gutter at that place; and on that kind of proof the plaintiff recovered a verdict. The judgment was reversed by this court for error in that instruction. Our late Brother Clark, in the course of his opinion, said : ' Was there in the circum stances of the injury any proof of negligence on the part of the borough of Easton in the construction of this crossing? There can be nc»inference of negligence from the mere fact of the injury. Municipalities are not in surers; they are simply responsible for injuries arising from the negligence of the corporate officers, and the burden of proving that negligence is upon those who allege it. An injury may occur from purely accidental causes, in which no fault can be imputed to any one. We are all liable to the ordinary accidents of life. Was this such an accident, or was it the result of the defendant's negligence? Was this gutter constructed in the usual and ordinary way? Was it reasonably safe and secure? ' Of course gutters and curbstones are necessary in paved sidewalks in towns; but the mere fact that a foot-passen ger steps into one, or stumbles over the other, whether by night or day, confers no right of action. There must be further affirmative proof of specific negligence in their construction before a recovery can be had. So here a gang-plank properly constructed, so far as the evidence goes, lying on the deck, where it had to be, and in its usual position, according to the testimony, and being a necessary appliance of the business, cannot, without more, confer a cause of action merely because a passenger falls over it. As well might it be claimed that if the plaintiff had stumbled over a coil of rope, or a snubbing-block, or a chair in the saloon, she could recover damages for the fall without proof of specific negligence. We are of opin ion that there is no proof of negligence in this case such as can establish liability on the part 'of the defendant."
Sterrett, J., dissented (no uncommon action on his part, as we have for years observed); but why? He does not tell, and we cannot imagine. We ex pect to see some one suing for stumbling over his own leg. Two SIDES. — A number of years ago, when the writer hereof was a small lad, there was a customary riddle, " How many sides has a round pitcher? " To which the answer was, "Two, — the inside and the outside." But it seems that this doctrine does not apply in law to a wagon. Thus in Commonwealth >>. Crane, 33 N. E. Rep. 388, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that where a statute makes it unlawful to sell oleomargarine from a wagon, etc., without having on both sides of the vehicle a placard inscribed, "Licensed to Sell Oleomargarine," it is not a compliance to hang such placard inside a cov ered wagon, although both ends of the wagon are open. The court observed : — "The defendant admits that the purpose of the act was to protect the public against fraud, and to provide an additional safeguard, by requiring peddlers who sell oleo margarine from wagons, and have the opportunity to cheat and deceive, to notify the public that they deal in oleomargarine. He further admits that the purpose was that the placards should be placed where they could be seen. While we have no doubt that this is the purpose of the act, we cannot concede that the defendant has complied with it, and we are of opinion that placing the placards on the inside of the cover of the wagon was a mere device to evade the manifest intent of the Legis lature." ,
SCREEN LAW. — In Commonwealth v. Brothers, 33 N. E. Rep. 386, a prosecution of a saloon-keeper for disobedience to the screen law, it appeared that the shop in question was in the rear of the premises. There were " two windows to this back shop. Upon one of the windows were blinds, closed, and a cur tain pulled clear down. On the other window, near some stairs, there was no curtain, but there were boxes and barrels piled up in the back yard, which obstructed the view to some extent. On the side opposite to the back shop were a tenement house and a livery-stable, but no view of any public street could be obtained from the back shop, and the win dows were not visible from any public street." Still it was held that these facts did noi relieve the de fendant from the charge of violating the act by maintaining screens, etc., in such a way as to inter fere with a view of the business conducted on the premises. Pretty particular are the courts in rum cases!
