Justice Samuel Blatchford. ruptcy Statute fathered by Secretary Chase, or under copyright controversy. In the course of his judicial duties when in the local Federal tribunals, he heard the cele brated arguments on the letters patent for insulating telegraph and cable wires with guttapercha, and as to whether a common carrier knowingly carrying an infringed pat ent article for purposes of ultimate sale could be made liable as a wrong-doer. He settled in favor of the Brooklyn Bridge its legality as a structure over navigable waters. In the libraries of the Bar Association in New York City, of its Law Institute and in the Albany State House, Blatchford's re ports show by the appearance of their usage how valuable they have been considered by lawyers. In writing opinions he was, per haps, lacking in that compression which marks the opinions of British judges in the last century. But he was never verbose nor tyronic, nor given to centonism. His ex pressions and rhetoric were ever his own, and not purloined from the briefs of counsel. The most elaborate opinion delivered by Justice Blatchford (see 132 U. S. Reports, p. 75) in the Supreme Court was in the case of the Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Miller, which decision held that the company was bound by a new provision of a new constitu tion of the State that imposed fresh burdens not contemplated by its charter; and that exemptions from future legislation to a com pany in order to control must be expressed in the original charter. Justice Blatchford largely participated in such judicial action as was demanded from the U. S. Supreme Court by the consideration of an Anti-polyg amous statute applicable to the Mormons; by certain " Granger Cases " in modifying decisions previously given; by the Terry murder case in San Francisco, and by the New York Electrocution Statute of capital punishment that was questioned as inflicting a cruel and unusual punishment. Justice Blatchford was not addicted to dis senting opinions. He was devoid of " fads," prejudices, and obstinacy of views. He read
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ily grasped a major premise, and as readily could seize upon the sophism of a minor. Even when at the bar he was famed for logi cal dealings. He never, whether advocate, jurisconsult, or judge, regarded law as an abstract prin ciple only, but as a rule of affairs and as the supreme force in government. But he took literature and society in the concrete, — so to illustrate the idea. No one enjoyed a good poem or novel more than he did, when ever he had leisure moments, and it may be well fancied those were few. Indeed it may be well said that all painstaking judges are devoid of leisure; for when an incumbent of the bench leaves court, he must take the business of thought, research, and compari son home with him. The ordinary layman who sees a judge sitting composedly in his official and cosey chair day after day, prob ably thinks judicial life an easy method of earning subsistence. But listening is the smallest part of judicial work. He must in his library winnow the grain of result from perhaps much argumentative chaff of verbiage or sophism or inaccurate illustration and precedent. He must award for decision reasons that will bear the test of time; and piles of manuscript soon fill his desk. Even the merchant knows the worry and perils of discriminating thoughts on the risks of sound judgments to be reached. Nevertheless Judge Blatchford could in society and at his old club — often visited, so as to obtain attrition of mind and disposition — show that he could forget for the moment his brain work, and socially display the ver satility of his emotional nature. He readily took, and as readily gave repartee. He held a merry and hearty laugh. His smile at times was womanly in its magnetism. He honored the power of the newspaper press, and could prove interestingly discursive on the topics of the day; nor did he — yet un obtrusively — forget his early interest in the political questions of the day, foreign or domestic. And his judgment upon current affairs was as impartial as were his judicial
