The Lawyer s Rasy Chair. NOTES OF CASES.
IDEM SONANS. — The Supreme Court of Illinois, in Gonzalia v. Bartelsman, 32 N. E. Rep. 534, held that " Meyer " and " Myers " are not idem sonans. This seems a little too precise. There is a consid erable collection of examples of this doctrine in Browne's •' Humorous Phases of the Law," in the chapter " De Minimis non curât Lex," in which it appears that the following have been held idem sonatis: Michael and Michaels; Pétrie and Pétris; Matthews and Mather; William and Williams; Rennoil and Rennolls. So it has been held of Biglow and Bigelow. On the other hand Franks and Frank have been held not idem sonans, and so of Jeffery and Jeffries. Тнк WIFU'S HOUSE — Vice-Chancellor Bird, ac cording to his official syllabus in Shinn v. Shinn, 24 All. Rep. IO22, has decided that every husband is bound to set his wife up in housekeeping if she de mands it, and that it will not do to offer to board her even at a first-class hotel furnished with all the lux ury of Monte Christo's grotto She is not bound to come under the dominion of any landlord, much less a landlady! Here is the syllabus : — I. Every wife is entitled to a house corresponding to the circumstances and condition of her husband, over which she shall be permitted to preside as such wife, and it is the duty of the husband to furnish such home 2. A house over which others have entire control, and in which the husband and wife reside as boarders simply, is not such house.
This is really startling, and would seem to saddle a new burden on the patient back of the commonlaw husband We do not believe that Judge liird, for example, would be bound at all hazards to pro vide such a luxurious nest for his mate anil their young; and fortunately his syllabus is not the lav/, and indeed the facts of the case and the opinion it self do riot warrant the syllabus. It was simply decided that the husband had not provided the wife with any home corresponding to his means and his station in society, and had treated her in a cruel and niggard manner with the evident design of driving her away. So long as one person must have the right to dictate whether the pair shall keep house or board, ¡t is difficult to see why it should be the wife rather than the husband. The wife is bound to fol low the husband when he " moves " or changes his town; and that being so, it cannot be that he is bound to follow her to a house of their own rather than a suitable boardinir-house or hotel or apartment. If it were otherwise, she would have the power to bind him for house-rent as a necessary, when he offered to board her suitably, which is absurd on its face. A
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different view of the husband's liability in respect to providing a home, and we think the correct one, may be found in Luter 7/. Shelley, 40 Hun, 197, in which it is held as follows : — "On June 28, 1884, the defendant Shelley was convicted as a disorderly person on the charge of abandoning his wife. The defendant, although not cohabiting with his wife, had, up to that time, furnished her with means for her support. She occupied rooms in the city of Roches ter, and on the day of the conviction and the following day the defendant called at the rooms to see her and was refused admittance. On the evening of the latter day he wrote a letter to her in which he said that he had provided a place for her support and maintenance, with necessary medical attendance, in the family of one Aldrich, at Kenyonville, Orleans County, and offered to go with her whenever she was ready; he stated that he was not able to support her in any other place, and that he trusted it would not be long before he could do better. This invitation the wife refused to accept on the ground that she was in poor health, and had lived in the city for many years; that she had no relatives or acquaintances at Kenyonville, and that no physician resided there. It appeared that the Al drich house, though not large, was comfortable and re spectable, and the physical comforts of the wife could be there fairly provided for. Held, that the evidence did not warrant the conviction of the defendant; that the hus band has a right to select a home for his wife, and his ' judgment, when fairly exercised, must govern in so far as to relieve him from the charge of being a disorderly per son " The court said — "It does not appear that their condition in life has been such heretofore, or that the means of the defendant are such now, as to characterize the place the husband offered to provide as unreasonable, or such as to shock the sense of propriety, or that to require the wife to live there would be harsh or cruel treatment in the sense which is applied to those terms in such relation. If they had resided at the place in question, it will hardly be contended, from what appears here, that a mere desire not to live there would have permitted her to leave the place and charge him for her support elsewhere. "And while it must be conceded that he ought to have respected her tastes and wishes in that respect, if his cir cumstances fairly permitted, yet the home tor him to pro vide for her is so much the matter of his judgment and control that his action in doing so is not the subject of review by the court unless it evinces bad faith^n view of all the circumstances.1 A place offered as a home might be such as he might suppose she would not accept, and thus indicate a purpose on his part not to furnish her sup port; but to so characterize it the place designated must be an unreasonable one for her residence and home, or such that the wife would be justified in leaving the place if she resided there, and as a consequence charge him with liability for her necessary support at such other place as she might obtain it. The home provided is neithei so remote nor so situated as to render its selection an unrea sonable exercise of his discretion. It was in the locality where the defendant was acquainted and had friends rei Babbitt a. Babbitt 69 III. 277; Hair ». Hair, m Rich. I'.q. 16).
