the hazard of the journey — especially where it is not shown that the car was not a sale one to ride in or that he had been forbidden to ride there, but there was some evidence that his employment required him to ride there. The Court said : "It is contended by counsel for appellant that plaintiff ought not to recover, because he voluntarily left the pas senger coach for his own pleasure, and knowingly assumed a more hazardous place on the train, and by that act di rectly contributed to his death. The facts of this case do not, in our opinion, bring it within the rule of the cases cited by counsel. In Baltimore & P. R. Co. v. Jones, 95 U. S. 439, the injured party was riding on the pilot of the locomotive when he was injured. In other cases the pas senger was riding upon platforms of cars, or riding on the foot-board in front of an engine. In Jacobus v. St. Paul & C. R. Co., 20 Minn. 125, 18 Am. Rep. 360, it was held that where a passenger was riding in a baggage car he might recover for an injury sustained while in that position if he was there with the knowledge of the conductor of the train, and without any attempt of the conductor to enforce a rule requiring passengers not to ride in baggage cars. In Dunn v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 58 Me. 187,4 Am. Rep. 267, plaintiff was riding in the 'saloon car' of a freight train, where the conductor permitted him to remain, and collected his fare. It was held that recovery might be had for an injury sustained by reason of the company's negligence. See also Creed v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 86 Pa. 139, 27 Am. Rep. 693, where recovery was held in a case where, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the conductor, a pas senger was permitted to ride in a caboose, which was for the exclusive use of the train hands. It is not necessary to further consider the case. Under the evidence the jury might well find that the deceased was in the direct line of his duty in riding in the show car, and that he was allowed to remain there without any effort on the part of the conductor to induce him to return to a passenger coach; and not only this, but as the evidence is now presented, it cannot be said as matter of law that riding in the show car was attended with any known hazard."
Trial by Jury. — They seem still to idealize trial by jury down in Alabama. In the late case of Western Railway -'. Mutch, 21 L. R. A. 316, the Chief Justice said: — "Trial by jury is a bulwark of American, as it has long been of English, freedom. It wisely divides the responsi bility of determinative adjudication, of punitive adminis tration, between the judge, trained in the wisdom and intricacies of the law, and twelve men chosen from the common walks of nonprofessional life; chosen for their sound judgment and stern impartiality. The one declares the rules of law applicable to the issue or issues formed, in the light of the testimony adduced; the other weighs the testimony, determines what facts it proves, and, moulded by the law as declared by the court, renders its verdict, In the jury box, and under the oath the jurors have
solemnly sworn on the holy evangelists of Almighty God, there is no room for friendship, partiality, or prejudice; no permissible discrimination between friends and enemies, between the rich and the poor, between corporations and natural persons. The ancients painted the Goddess of Justice as blindfolded, and jurors must be blind to the personal consequences of the verdicts they render. If the, testimony convinces their judgments of the existence of certain facts, they must be blind to the consequences which result from those facts. A wish that it were otherwise furnishes no excuse for deciding against their convictions. Justice thus administered commands the approbation of heaven and earth alike : and a verdict thus rendered meets all the requirements of the juror's oath, in the fullest sense of the word, — a true expression of the convictions fixed on the minds of the jury by the testimony." This was the ideal. The practical seems some what different, for the court reversed the judgment because " the verdict of the jury was so palpably against the evidence." 'Twas ever thus in railroad cases. The "bulwark" does not serve the purpose of " stern impartiality."
Contract — Husband for Wife — Special Ownership.— In Jacksonville, St. A. & H. R. Co. v. Mitchell, Florida Supreme Court (21 Lawy. Am. Rep. 487), it was held that where husband and wife are traveling together over a railway and the husband purchases the tickets for himself and wife, and has his own and wife's baggage checked to the point of their destination, himself receiving the checks, and the railway company loses or fails to deliver the trunk of the wife, containing her wearing apparel and that of her child, the husband can, in his own name alone, without joining his wife, maintain an action for damages therefor, and that a recovery by the hus band is a complete bar to any subsequent suit upon the same cause of action by the wife. The Court said : — "In such case where there is a special property in the goods to be carried resting in one, although the general property therein rests in another, such special ownership therein is sufficient to warrant the former in maintaining a suit in his own name alone for the redress of a violated con tract made with him to carry and deliver such goods, Denver, S. P. & P. R. Co. v. Frame, 6 Colo. 382; Freeman v. Birch, 3 Q. B. 835; Blanchard v. Page, 8 Gray 281; Dunlop v. Lambert, 6 Clark & F. 600; Great Western R. Co. v. McComas, 33 Ill. 185. And a recovery had in such case by the person having such special ownership will be a com plete bar to any subsequent suit upon the same cause of action that may be instituted by the person having the general property in the goods lust. Green v. Clark, 13 Barb. 57; Great Western R. Co. v. McComas, and Denver, S. P. & P. R. Co. v. Frame, supra; Owners of Steamboat ' Farmer"'v. McCraw, 26 Ala. 189.
