Hon made to the king or his council unless it was by indictment or presented by good and lawful people of the same neighborhood where the fact was done, in due manner, or by process of writ original at the common law. Further it enacted that none should be ousted of his franchise or his freehold unless he were duly brought in to answer, and was fore-judged of the same by the course of the law; and if anything was done otherwise that it should be redressed and held void. It was however subsequently thought insufficient to merely declare such proceedings void, but suggestions to the king being often false or malicious it was enacted by 37 Ed. III. c. 18, that to pre vent such for the future, all persons making suggestions should be sent with them before the chancellor, treasurer and the council, there to find surety for prosecuting these suggestions; and if the suggestions were found evil, that the party should incur the same penalty as the adversary would if con victed, and then the matter should be left to the process of the law. This latter clause was repealed the following year (Stat. 38, Ed. III. Stat. 1, c. 9) and instead it was or dained that a person failing in proof of his suggestion according to the former statute should be committed to prison till he had agreed with the defendant for the damage and slander he had sustained, and besides made ransom and fine to the king. Either the evil was not abated by these statutes or the uneasiness of the people re quired further declarations of the Parliament on the subject, for we find that about four years later an act was passed which seem ingly was intended to give a finishing blow to all extraordinary judicature whether civil or criminal. The Commons having again complained that persons were brought be fore the council by writ " and otherwise upon grievous pain" (sur greve peine), against the law, it was enacted (Stat. 42, Ed. III. c. 3) that no man be put to answer before justices without presentment or mat
ter of record or by due process and writ original, according to the old law of the land, shid that anything done to the contrary should be void. The process of bringing defendants before the council was however probably regarded as " due process and writ original, accord ing to the old law of the land." In any event some plausible method was evidently devised to prevent the literal operation of the statute. During the reign of Richard II. the judica ture of the council was exercised in all its amplitude, notwithstanding the attempts made in the last reign to draw the causes of which it held cognizance to the ordinary courts, and complaints of its encroachments were repeatedly made to Parliament. In 1377 it was prayed that no suits be tween parties should be ended before any lords or others of the council, but before the justices only. In the following year it was prayed that no man should answer before the council, by writ or otherwise, concerning his freehold, but only at the common law: to which it was answered that no man should be " forced to answer finally " there on such matters, though all persons should be obliged to answer before the council concerning " oppressions." Thus, a limit seemed to be fixed to the jurisdiction of the council, by allowing it to entertain all sorts of suits commenced there originally by com plaint or otherwise, but instead of determin ing finally, to refer them, as it should seem proper, according to the subject of debate, to the different courts of common law. Besides the business that would perpet ually engage the council when it acted in this manner, as auxiliary to the judicial de termination of the courts of law, it was laid down by Parliament that "oppressions" might be determined there finally: and in all times, particularly those of disorder and change, numberless are the causes which the council might have drawn to itself under the idea of " oppressions."
