some degree above the law, it had shrunk into such comparative insignificance that Henry VII., who desired to have an effective instru ment for the exercise of his judicial prerog ative always at his command, thought it ex pedient to procure parliamentary aid to give support and sanction to the Star Chamber. This resulted in the enactment of 3 Hen. VII., c. I, — a statute which did not erect, as some have supposed, the court of Star Chamber, but remodeled it. The preamble recites that the " king, re membering how by unlawful maintenances, giving of liveries, signs and tokens, and re tainers, by indentures, promises, oaths, writ ings, or otherwise, embraceries of his subjects, untrue demeanings of sheriffs in making of panels and other untrue returns, by tak ing of money by juries,1 by great riots and unlawful assemblies, the policy and good rule of this realm is almost subdued; and for the not punishing of these inconveniencies, and by occasion of the premises little or nothing may be found by inquiry," that is by the ordinary proceeding of an inquest by jury; " whereby the laws of the land in execution may take little effect, to the in crease of murders, robberies, perjuries, and unsureties of all men living" etc., for the reformation of which it was now ordained, that the chancellor, treasurer, and privy-seal, or two of them calling to them a bishop, and a temporal lord, being of the council, and the two chief justices, or in their ab sence, two other justices, upon bill or in formation put to the chancellor for the king, 1 There is a curious error in the print in Pulton of this portion of the act. The act runs, " by taking of money by juries " (i. e. embracery), or in the French of the statutes of the realm — "pruise dargent par jurrez." Pulton prints it " by taking of money, by injuries" etc. Coke in 4 Inst. 62, in his account of the jurisdiction of the Star Chamber, follows the mistake of Pulton and appends a comment on the " large word " injuries. The 4th Just, was not published till the year after the abolition of the Star Chamber, but Pulton was an eminent authority. Coke long acted as a judge in the Star Chamber upon this reading of the Star statute, — "an error," says Wright, " which may have had political as well as legal consequences." Wright, Crim. Consp. 7.
or any other, against any person for any misbehavior above mentioned, have author ity to call before them by writ or jury seal, the offenders and others, as it shall seem fit, by whom the truth may be known; and to examine and punish after the form and effect of statutes thereof made, in like man ner as they ought to be punished, if they were convict after the due order of the law. This is the substance, and nearly the very words of the statute, which plainly points out the occasion of this new regula tion, the objects of cognizance, the judges, the process and proceedings, with the power of punishing — from which it is manifest that the king's council derived from this statute an enlargement of its judicial authority. There is nothing prohibitory of the former jurisdiction or mode of proceeding here, but that is, on the contrary, recognized and affirmed by the very ingenious wording of the act, for instead of declaring that the officers named shall have power etc., it merely declares that they have such power, thereby clearly intimating a recognition of an already existing authority, and specially insuring its preservation and application in later specific cases. Coke seems to attribute to the statute no other effect than that of varying the procedure of the Star Chamber by enabling the judges to examine defendants; but this seems impossible both because such was the regular procedure of the court, and because that procedure does not appear to have been confined after the statute to cases which fell within it.1 1 Hudson refers to the subject in such a way as to show that at one time it was a moot point whether the council had any criminal jurisdiction other than that which this statute conferred upon them, but that the court held that it had. He says : " I well remember that the Lord Chan cellor Egerton would often tell that in his time, when he was a student, Mr. Sergeant Lovelace put his hand to a demurrer in this for that the matter of the bill contained other matters than were mentioned in the statute 3 Hen. 7, and Mr. Plowden, that great lawyer, put his hand thereto first, whereupon Mr. Lovelace easily followed. But the cause being moved in court, Mr. Lovelace being a young man, was called to answer the error of his ancient
