law been more pronounced and varied than at present. This strikingly appears upon an examination of the law of corporations. It is not too much to say that from the deci sions of the courts of one state no idea can be derived of the law governing corpora tions in another state, and very little idea of the laws of the home state can be gained without a continual reference to the statutes to note the dates of changing laws. Indeed the whole subject of corporation law is built upon statutes, and they much more than the decisions are the sources of this law. Whence these statutes are derived it is not easy to trace, but of one thing we may be sure, the decided cases are not respon sible for them. By the enactments of Codes also, and by the revisions of statutes, nearly every branch of jurisprudence has been greatly affected, and whether we turn to the law of real estate, the law of contracts, the law of domestic relations, the law of wills or the law of torts, we find all largely dependent upon statutes for the origin of many of their existing rules. By this brief review we may therefore see that the apparent sources of our law are remote, varied and intricate, and however much certain cases may have contributed toward the establishment of a specific rule, we will probably find the source of the rule far behind the case in which it was author itatively announced; and we may also be sure that he who now neglects to consider the statutes as original sources of law will find himself outside the current of the times. But a review of the development of our law will be likely to convince the investigator of another thing, and that is, that beyond and behind all the sources of the law thus far mentioned there is one which is still deeper and more real, and one to which all decided cases and all statutes must answer for their stability, namely, reason. And it is the sphere of reason in giving rise to and in upholding rules of law that I wish partic ularly to consider.
There is a popular fallacy that the law is founded upon technical rules and precedents. But nothing is farther from the truth. The law is founded on reason, and from the beginning of civilized society the human reason has been struggling to evolve rules, in accord with the prevalent ideas of right, to govern the affairs of men. And the present aim of the law is to control human actions with justice. Therefore the highest authority for any rule of law is that it com mends itself to the human reason as a just rule. In our country even the form of govern ment is founded on reason. A system has been adopted which commends itself to the intelligence of the people as a just and rea sonable method of maintaining the rights of the country and of each one of its inhabit ants. The Constitution of the United States and the various state Constitutions, all are dependent on reason for their stability, and not upon precedent. They derive their force from the public opinion which up holds them and which in turn is founded on the general intelligence of the people as directed and controlled by the opinions and reasons of thoughtful men. So the decisions of all the courts find their most lasting authority in the fact that they are founded on reason. In early times the foundation of the law in reason was clearly recognized, and the value of the Roman law lies in the fact of its orderly and comprehen sive presentation of rules of conduct and life. And we now, looking back to ancient rules, follow or reject them because to our view, with the light of experience and in our circumstances, they are reasonable or unrea sonable. We respect their authority be cause they- are valuable products of the minds of thoughtful men of the past, and we strive to retain the results of past ex perience for use in future time and guard edly follow precedent because it is reason able that we should do so. There has been too a noticeable tendency in many branches
