Historic Collisions between Bench and Bar. which we knew would console him, as it was generally brandy with some water added, to give it a name rather than materially alter its nature." (Works, Vol. 4, p. 384.) Something has been said about Kenealy's case above. As a matter of fact, his utter ances in court never formed the subject of inquiry by any professional tribunal, but the important point to notice is that it was his Inn, Gray's, which set the Lord Chancellor in motion (on account of his editorship of the Englishman ), with the result that he was dispatented, and which disbenched and disbarred him on the same, ground. It will be clear from all the instances that no formula can exactly define to what length of retort or freedom of speech in addressing a judge counsel may with propriety — (as to safety, there is practically no question) — go. Obviously, a genuine instinct of selfrespect will inspire an advocate with the exact measure of what is due to himself, and what is due to his professional superior, just as it will antagonists in any other con troversy. This is what Campbell called in Erskine, " the felicitous precision with which he meted out the requisite and justifiable portion of defiance." Without that instinct it matters little at the bar, or anywhere else, on which side the merits of the dispute are; it cannot be conducted in a seemly way by him that lacks it. 1'erhaps the true " rule " may be collected from a dictum attributed to Curran argncndo. He offended Judge Robinson, who exclaimed furiously, " Sir, you are forgetting the re spect that you owe to the dignity of the judicial character." " Dignity? my lord," said Curran. " Upon that point I shall cite you a case from a book of some authority, with which youareperhaps not unacquainted. 'A poor Scotchman, upon his arrival in Lon don, thinking himself insulted by a stranger and imagining that he was the stronger man, resolved to resent the affront and, taking off his coat, delivered it to a bystander to hold. But having lost the battle he turned to re
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sume his garment, when he discovered that he had unfortunately lost that also — that the trustee of his habiliments had decamped during the affray.' So, my Lord, when the person who is invested with the dignity of the judgment-seat lays it aside for a mo ment to enter into a disgraceful personal contest, it is in vain, when he has been worsted in the encounter, that he seeks to resume it --it is in vain that he endeavors to shelter himself behind an authority which he has abandoned." Robinson exclaimed, " If you say another word, I'll commit you." — "Then, my Lord, it will be the best thing you'll have committed this year." The judge did not do as he threatened, any more than was done in any of the cases already mentioned, or indeed in any re corded; but it is instructive to read that "He applied to his brethren to unfrock the daring advocate," but they refused. The true principle may be adduced from Curran's apologue. So long as a judge speaks in that capacity, be he right or wrong, he is entitled to all respect of demeanor and all courtesy of language. The moment he de scends to personalities, invective or criticism not warranted or required by his duty to the court, that is, to the public, he strips himself of his judicial function, and the person ag grieved by his language is entitled to speak to him as man to man, a relation which, of course, still includes that of gentleman to gentleman. In such a competition the judge, of course, starts with everything in his favor; if he is worsted, or reduced to silence, it must be his own fault. That some judges have suc ceeded in being severe without being msulting, may be seen from Roger North's ac count of his brother, the chief justice (about 1675). " There were yet some occasions of his justice, whereupon he thought it neces sary to reprehend sharply. As when coun sel pretended solemnly to impose nonsense upon him, and when he had dealt with them and yet they persisted — this was what he
