not know the nature of his act or that it was wrongful, he would be excusable." 3. Involuntary drunkenness resulting from a temporarily diseased condition or from in sane predisposition will exempt from crimi nal responsibility. On this point the follow ing ruling by Chief Baron Palles may be cited : " If a person from any cause — say long watching, want of sleep, or depravation of blood — is reduced to such a condition that a smaller quantity of stimulant will make him drunk than would produce such a state if he were in health, then neither law nor common sense can hold him responsible for his acts, inasmuch as they are not voluntary but produced by disease." (Reg, z'. Mary, R. 1887. Kerr's Inebriety, 2d edit. 395.) In Reg. v. Mountain (April. 1888), Baron Pollock laid down a similar rule in the case of insane predisposition. Students of " Pollock on Contracts " — and what American lawyer does not belong to the category? — do not need to have the history of English law in regard to the contracts of inebriates placed before them in any detail. It has passed through three stages. The first was governed by the common law rule that no man of full age can be allowed to stultify himself. The drunkard was there fore not allowed to set up his drunkenness as a defense to an action of contract. In the second stage the contracts of inebriates were held either void for incapacity or void able for fraud, according to circumstances. The modern rule was settled in Molton v. Camroux (18 L. J. Kx. 68, 356), and Matthews v. Baxter (L. R. 8 Kx. 132). It may be stated thus : A contract entered into by a person apparently sober, and not known cither actually or constructively by the other contracting party to be intoxicated, is valid if fair and /юна fide, and especially if wholly or partly executed so that the parties cannot be restored to their original position, In Matthews v. Baxter, A had bought houses and land of В at a public auction. A was at the time, and to the knowledge of B,
so drunk as to be incapable of transacting business. It was held by the court of ex chequer that A's contract was not void, but voidable only, and that he might ratify it when sober. An interesting rider to this doctrine in regard to the burden of proof has recently been enunciated by the court of appeal, in the case of The Imperial Loan Company v. Stone (8 Times L. R., 408). The plaintiffs sued to recover the balance due upon a promissory note signed by the defendant as surety. The defendant pleaded that when he signed the note he was — us the plaintiffs well knew — of unsound mind and incapable of understanding what he was doing. The action was tried before Mr. Justice Denman and a jury. The jury found that the defendant was not of sane mind, but could not agree as to whether or not the plaintiffs were aware of the fact. There upon Mr. Justice Denman entered judgment for the defendant, being of the opinion that the onus lay upon t/ic plaintiffs to show that they did not know that the defendant was of unsound mind. This decision was, how ever, reversed by the court of appeal. " If one went through all the cases," said Lord Esher, with characteristic boldness, " and endeavored to point out the grounds on which they rest, one would get into a maze. The time has come when this court must lay down the rule. In my opinion, the result of the cases is this : when a person enters into a contract and afterward alleges that he was insane at the time he entered into the contract — I mean an ordinary contract — and that he did not know what he was doing and proved that this was so by the law of England, that contract is as binding upon him in every respect, whether executed or executory, as if he were sane, unless he can prove that at the time he made the contract the plaintiff knew that he was insane, and so insane as not to know what he was about." This applies to drunkenness equally with insanity. The law of England already provides for
