favor of setting aside provisions in a will that are manifestly absurd or unjust. This largely explains why there are so many attempts in the United States to set aside wills, and why so many of these attempts are successful. The fact that a man is never absolutely cer tain that the provisions of his will will be carried out has suggested to many the pro priety of disposing of their property during their lifetime. But there are objections to that course. Not long ago a man in this city turned over all his property to his wife. No sooner did he do so than she turned him out on the street, and not long afterward he died a pauper. Perhaps the most remarkable wills are those which aim to promote virtue and dis courage vice. Not long ago a very wealthy gentleman of Long Island died, who pro vided that none of his heirs should inherit unless they could show that they led a life of almost angelic virtue. Among the con
ditions mentioned in the will were these: That they should not smoke or drink; that they should rise every morning and break fast at a certain hour, and be in the house every evening at a certain hour; that they should be industrious and strictly moral in their lives; that they should never enter a bar-room, and should not get married before the age of twenty-five. The heirs were thunderstruck at these provisions, as they practically disinherited all but one of them. Recently a cynical old man in a western town died, who in his will devised all his property to that man in the town who could prove that he was a Christian; and then a definition of a Christian was given which would exclude every one who had lived on earth, except the Saviour himself; and in the opi^*n of many it would have excluded even Him. In this case the court promptly set aside the will and gave the property to the legal heir.—Exchange.
THE POWER OF REMOVAL FROM FEDERAL OFFICES. By James W. Stiixmax. ONE of the most interesting questions arising under the Constitution of the United States, is that in relation to the power of removal from office of the civil officers of the Federal Government. This question has recently arisen in the District of Columbia; and the Supreme Court of that District has decided that in equity the executive branch of the Government has no jurisdiction to en join the postmaster-general and his first assistant from removing a complainant, John G. Woods, of Louisville, Ky., who was sup planted as superintendent of mails by the appointment of a successor. Mr. Justice Cox, who delivered the opinion of the court, holds that the power of appointment lodged in the heads of the executive departments of the Government confers on them the power of removal, and further, that the only pro
hibition on such executive officers, in the matter of the removal of inferior officers, is that no one shall be removed for refusing to make political contributions. As this de cision applies only to the removal of inferior officers by the heads of the departments, it is proposed in this article to consider the question whether or not the same principle applies to the removal of superior ones, or, in other words, whether this power resides in the President alone, or in the President and the Senate jointly. Before examining the constitutional pro visions in regard to removals from office, let us glance briefly at the history of the ques tion. The earliest occasion on which it was fully examined was during the first session of the first Congress of the United States, which assembled in the city of New York on
