Ability to Read the Constitution. — The Supreme Court of Wyoming deemed it necessary to cover twelve double-column pages of the L. R. A. to decide that a person is not " able to read the Constitution of this State," unless he can read it in the English language instead of a translation. Does A. " know B. by sight, if he has never seen him, but knows his portrait by reputation? Those Wyoming judges have plenty of time to be per plexed. (Rasumssin v. Baker, 38 L. R. A. 773.) Bicycles as Baggage. — In the last number of the " American Law Review " is an elaborate article partly devoted to this subject, by Mr. W. C. Rodgers, in which the writer takes the ground that bicycles are ordinary baggage, even in the absence of statute to that effect. It seems that the only decision on the point at present is one of the St. Louis Court of Appeals (44 Cent. Law Journ. 465), directly to the contrary. The learned writer cer tainly presents a formidable array of analogies to sustain his view, but it will be observed that the articles are nearly all small, and most of them capable of being put in a trunk — an easel being the largest. As to a dog, it has been held both ways. But when it comes to large and cumbrous articles, especially such as demand unusual care, the authorities tend in the opposite direction. So stage properties, gro ceries, a feather bed, an artist's sketches, a lawyer's papers, musical instruments, a sewing machine, and gold spectacles have been excluded from the list. So of a hobby horse, in a recent English case. A bicycle, although light, is cumbrous; if not crated, requires extraordinary care, and if crated, still requires careful handling, and takes up considerable room. Nothing is commoner than babies, and a baby carriage is a common and necessary article, but would Mr. Rodgers argue that it is ordinary baggage? A good many people have pet birds, but a parrot in a cage is not baggage. Mr. Rodgers argues that it is not incumbent on the owner to crate his bicycle, but this would be intolerable in practice, as the uncrated wheel would take up a great deal of room, and be liable to injury in ordinarily careful handling. Mr. Rodgers says that the question has been put at rest by legislative enactment in Arkansas; so it has been in New York, but these enactments would seem to make against his contentions. A nicer question would be whether a tin bath-tub, such as English tourists habitually travel with, is ordinary baggage. In the hobby horse case, the court defined baggage as such articles as are ordinarily and usually carried by persons travelling. This definition would exclude a good many things admitted to be baggage, such as pistols, for example. We do not think it essential that the article should be one that is generally carried
271
by travellers; it is enough if it may reasonably be carried by him for his personal requirements. An officer's swords or a fisherman's rods are not generally carried by the travelling public, but they are none the less baggage, and yet we do not think that a vehicle like a bicycle comes within that category. A Difference in Game. — An interesting inquiry frequently arises whether an act is within or outside of the scope of a servant's employment, especially where it is substantially to serve some purpose of his own rather than to promote the master's interest. The most amusing case of this kind that has ever come to our notice is Winkler v Fisher, 95 Wiscon sin, 355. Mr. Fisher, the elder, told the defendant, his son, aged sixteen, to go into a certain field and shoot crows and he would give him ten cents apiece. Instead of this, young Fisher went squirrel-hunting, with another boy, and having captured two, they went to a neighboring house to get a string to tie the animals together, and in the course of the visit, young Fisher carelessly and unintentionally discharged his gun, and the shot dotted the plaintiff's eye. The jury found for the plaintiff, but the appellate court re versed the judgment, holding that hunting squirrels for fun was not shooting crows for reward, and therefore was not within the scope of the employment. It was lucky for father Fisher that the accident did not hap pen while his boy was shooting crows. Another case, not so amusing, is Kaiser v McLean 20 App. Div. 326. The defendant, a contractor to build an elevated railway, employed a man to light lamps at the works and keep boys away. Boys in truding on the work, he threw a stone at them and chased them away beyond the structure, and one of them unnecessarily ran on a railroad and was killed by a train. It was held that the employer was not liable. " There was no evidence that he was em ployed or authorized by his employer to commit any assault upon anybody in keeping his lamps lighted and the boys away from them." One judge dissented and we think he was right to a certain extent : the master would have been liable if the stone had killed the boy. But there is some doubt on the point of proximate cause, and the court seems to imply this, for they say there was no need for the boy to run on the track; he might have run in another direction with the other boys. One judge concurred in the result, evi dently upon this view, and we think the two who held the first proposition, that the watchman's act was not in the scope of his employment, are manifestly wrong. In striking contrast is the decision in Meade v Chicago etc. R. Co. 68 Mo. App. 921 holding the de fendant liable for the act of its servant, employed to keep "bums" away from the station, in saturating plaintiffs clothes with benzine and setting fire to them.
