The Lawyers Easy Chair. measures, we would add Ignatius Donnelly's Cypher on the Bacon-Shakespeare idiocy. At the risk of again arousing the wrath of our esteemed and ad mired friend, Thompson, who calls us a " mild poetical genius," we might be driven, if the enemy proved obstinate, to hurl upon him, as a dernier ressort, his six volumes of Corporation Law. (By the way, nobody would even think of calling Thompson mild or poetical — we stop at that.) We pray the recording angel to write us down as one who hates big books because he loves his fellowmen. The Chairman knows and feels his own limitations, but of one thing in his career he is undisguisedly proud — he has never been guilty of a Big Book. He would not write one even to blow the Spaniards out of Cuba. But let the Administra tion seriously consider our proposal. It would work well both ways, in the most favorable result, and one way, at all events, which is more than can be said of most untried expedients in warfare.
NOTES OF CASES. Self-Serving Evidence. — As a general rule a party is not allowed to adduce in evidence his own acts and declarations in his own favor — "self-serv ing," as the law calls them. There is no good reason for this rule in cases where the act was done or the declaration made before any controversy had arisen on the subject, and yet such acts and declara tions are only exceptionally admitted in evidence. We find an interesting case of this kind in Parkhurst vs. Krellinger, 69 Vt. 375, when the controversy was concerning the defendant's liability for neces saries furnished his daughter, and to support his claim that she was of age he " was allowed to show that she had a birthday party, on which occasion there was a birthday cake with figures thereon indi cating her age. The party was before the contro versy arose, and at a time when the defendant could have no motive in representing the age of his daugh ter to be different from what it was in fact." The court said ' ' the evidence must be regarded as in the nature of an act of the defendant that rendered his claim more probable."
Dogs Again. — In Georgia a dog is a " domestic animal." Wilcox v. State, 39 L. R. A. 709. The court said : — "The sole question made, therefore, is whether a dog is a domestic animal. There is some conflict in the decisions of the courts of different states on the subject, but the de cided weight of authority seems to be that a dog is a do mestic animal. Some of the leading cases so holding are State v. McDuffie, 34 N. H. 526, 69 Am. Dec. 516; Hur
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ley v. State, 30 Tex. App. 333; State v. Giles, 125 Ind. 124; Dodson v. Mock, 20 N. C. (4 Dev. & B. I..) 146; and Shaw v. Craft, 37 Fed. Rep. 217." The contrary was held in State v. Harriman, 75 Me. 562; 46 Am. Rep. 423, Appleton, C. J., dis senting in a convincing opinion — that is to say, convincing everybody but his colleagues.
Street Sprinkling. — Another pertinent case for warm weather is State v. New Orleans &c. R. Co., 49 L. Am. 1571; 39 L. R. A. 618, holding that an ordinance providing that it shall be " unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation to operate any electric, trolley, or other cars or trains on the streets of this city without first providing in some reasonable manner for the sprinkling of the streets through which their cars run," and "that any person, firm, or corpo ration violating this ordinance shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be subject to a fine of $25, or thirty days in the parish jail, or both, at the discretion of the recorder," is unreasonable and void. The court said : — "There is lndefiniteness in the ordinance. It does not set forth with the least particularity what shall be done, or the extent of the service required, in order to escape the penalty it ordained should be inflicted for not sprinkling the streets. The failure or performance may vary each day and in each locality where sprinkling may be required. No attempt was made to indicate how the work shall be done, the days the streets should be sprinkled, the capacity for sprinkling the sprinklers should have, and the number of sprinklings that should be applied each day or at such times as may have been intended. "In so far as relates to the work of ' sprinkling ' the streets from curb to curb, less that portion over which de fendant has a franchise, in our judgment the requirement of the ordinance is not equal and uniform. These streets are used by the public. The work necessary to maintain their cleanliness, or to insure freedom from excessive dust, is a burden which the municipality cannot impose upon particular persons and corporations, only because they own a franchise over an adjacent way. It cannot be imposed by municipal ordinance in the manner here attempted. The defendant cannot lie compelled to clean and sprinkle streets not covered by its.contract and over which it has no fran chise. The dust raised by defendant's cars, it may be, is carried by the winds to the streets near. The evidence does not disclose that such is a fact. Presumably however it is; but defendant's cars are not the only vehicles which raise the dust and it would scarcely be desirable equality to make it sprinkle all the dust. The question may be pro pounded : Can they not be made to sprinkle their own tracks, and relieve their own road, as well as the adjacent streets, of the dust raised by their cars? To this the answer immediately suggests itself: The ordinance being indefinite and uncertain, it would serve no purpose to decide in this case the issue raised by the question. Having determined that the ordinance in its entirety is unreasonable, we would not be justified in holding that it is reasonable and valid in
