London Legal Letter, he thought the accused had committed, but for which he had not been tried. Another judge, who was recently ap pointed from the position of an official referee, — Mr. Justice Ridley, — has also aroused a good deal of comment by his peculiarly abrupt way of treating counsel and trying to decide cases before they have been heard. The methods which he had grown accustomed to in deciding matters referred to him for the assessment of dam ages, and which, although irritating to coun sel,, were comparatively harmless, are now working consternation when continued in the High Court, particularly in cases where there are juries. Not long ago, in an action /or commission on the sale of a yacht, be fore the defendant's case was opened, and during the cross-examination of one of the plaintiff's witnesses, Mr. Justice Ridley said to the defendant, " I think you are jockeying this man out of his commission." Defend ant's counsel protested, and said that his client had already paid one commission. "I ought not to have said that," replied the judge, " but I think the plaintiff is entitled to his commission." It is unnecessary to say that the verdict and judgment went for the plaintiff. The result may or may not have been right, but it is not in human nature that the defendant should think it was right, or that his case had been fairly tried. I was not a little amused to hear an emi nent barrister, in commenting on the present condition of our Bench, affirm that he was not sure that there was not something to be said, after all, in favor of an elective judi ciary. It might be, and doubtless was, open to terrible abuses in the hands of unscrupu lous politicians, but the people were not, as a mass, incapable of making a good selec tion. An honest man, with good common sense, was apt to make an infinitely better judge than an able lawyer or a good advo cate who was not possessed of the great quality of natural discernment. And, above
87
all, the system of electing judges for a stated period enabled the bar to get rid of an in competent or an unsuccessful judge. He was disposed to advocate the retention of the power of appointment, as at present exercised in England by the Lord Chan cellor, but to modify the system by pre scribing a fixed and definite term of tenure of the office. It was abhorrent to him, and would be to lawyers generally in England, that a judge should descend from the Bench and assume the active practice of the pro fession, and he therefore suggested retiring pensions or half-pay allowances, which would add but little to the cost of maintaining the judiciary; but whatever extra expense was occasioned would be more than compen sated for by the removal from the staff of judges of those who had proved their unfit ness, or who had, by reason of old age, lost their former capacity. While on this question of appointment to the Bench, I may remind your readers that this patronage is vested in the Lord Chan cellor for the time being. The career of the present Lord Chancellor has few, if any, parallels in legal history. He has during the past year been made an earl, and is the fifth chancellor upon whom in the present cen tury that dignity has been conferred. Lord Halsbury has held his high office for a longer period, under the several adminis trations of Lord Salisbury, than any Chan cellor since the Restoration, with the exception of Lord Hardwicke, Lord Thurlow, and Lord Eldon, and in the extent of the patronage which he has exercised he prob ably surpasses them all. Of the twentyeight judges who constitute the Court of Appeal, and the Chancery, Queen's Bench, and Probate divisions, no fewer than twenty were raised to their present offices during one or the other of his chancellorships. Of the fifty-five County Court judges (and it must be remembered that these important functionaries receive salaries of $7,500), about one half are Lord Halsbury's ap
