William Adams Richardson. President and secretary of the treasury. It was insisted that the reserve in the treasury should be issued to case the money market. The President was staying at the time for rest- at Long Branch, while the secretary re mained at Washington. More and more urgent appeals came over the wires for aid from the public funds. Secretary Richard son knew that there must be a limit to these loans, or the government would be seriously crippled. The credit of the country must be maintained abroad. The pressure was great on the administration, on one side not to issue any more paper money, and to stop pay ment on it, if necessary; and on the other, to put forth the whole reserve of hard money. The President, persuaded by counsel he thought competent, telegraphed the secre tary from Long Branch, to issue a large quantity of the reserve, and buy bonds and give notes the next morning. Me then started for Washington, where he found his order had not been obeyed. After consulta tion with the secretary he became satisfied with the reasons given for suppressed action in the matter. Later a telegram came from Long Branch for the secretary to meet the President in New York, at Fifth Avenue Hotel. Going at once, he explained to the President that the treasury must be kept strong to afford relief, if necessary, after the panic was over; and that $12,000,000 must be the limit, if the department would be kept out of the crash. An interview had been arranged at the hotel, by noted business men who appeared there in great numbers. Many speeches were made, some of them violent, urging the President to issue at once the forty-five mil lions reserve. The panic must be stopped, or a larger mob than was ever known in New York would be the consequence. The President asked that the proposition should be made in writing. The men retired for consultation. In a few hours the written proposition was presented, signed by men of prominent financial responsibility. It was
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urged that the treasury department should advance a loan of $20,000,000 to the banks, upon the receiptofclearing-house certificates, with a promise of more money if necessary. As Mr. Hackett remarks: " Of course, as every one now perceives, there could have been but one reply given to such a request. The President could act only within the law; and there was absolutely no law that by any stretch of construction could be held to have converted the treasury department into a loan institution." Moved by their entreaties, the President had consented that he and the secretary should meet these business men at the office of the sub-treasury the next morning, ready for all necessary action. When the room was cleared, and the door locked, Secretary Richardson told the President that the first thing to be done was for them to return to Washington. The President reminded him of the promise he had given these men to stop the panic. The secretary said, "The District of Columbia was the only constitu tional seat of government; the present panic was not the work of government, and it was not the duty of government to stop it." "But," reiterated the President, " we shall be expected to-morrow morning at the office of the sub-treasury." To which the secre tary replied that as soon as they were away, and no help from government was at hand, these men would be thrown upon their own self-reliance and business resources; and the mob would be dispersed. At length the President was brought to see the practical wisdom of the suggestions. The next morning the papers announced that President Grant had gone to Long Branch and Secretary Richardson had re turned to Washington. In large letters the "Tribune " declared, " The Panic Over." Thus the treasury department was saved from being embroiled in the financial strains of business circles, and the credit of the govern ment preserved. During his connection with the treasury,
